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THE "SPECIAL RIGHTS" CANARD IN THE DEBATE
OVER LESBIAN AND GAY CIL RIGHTS
SAMUEL A. MARCOSSON*
INTRODUCTION
Opponents of civil rights protections for lesbians and gay
men have employed a number of strategies in recent years to
oppose the extension of anti-discrimination statutes to include
sexual orientation as a protected category, and have campaigned
to strike such laws where they have passed.1 They have
attempted to portray homosexuals as immoral sinners,' and have
claimed that societal disapproval of homosexuality is necessary to
maintain the traditional family unit.3 They have argued that
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University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, Winter 1995; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1986; B.S. Bradley University, 1983. I would like to thank Dianna
Johnston for her helpful comments. This article was written in the author's
private capacity. No official support or endorsement by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission or any other agency of the United States Government
is intended or should be inferred.
1. Opposition to gay rights ordinances, statutes, and policies constitutes
what might be called the "defensive posture" of anti-gay forces. The most
famous example of this tactic is the successful 1977 campaign led by Anita
Bryant to persuade voters to repeal Dade County, Florida's gay rights
ordinance. See Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARv.
L. REv. 1905, 1908 (1993). More recently, opponents of gay rights have
assumed a more offensive stance, going beyond seeking repeal of gay rights laws
to affirmatively barring the enactment of lesbian and gay civil rights protections
via the normal legislative process. See id. at 1905 (describing Colorado
Amendment Two, which "not only repealed existing state laws that protect gay
people from discrimination, but also banned all future laws that would
recognize such claims by lesbians and gay men") (emphasis in original).
2. See id. at 1921 & n.125 (describing "religious motivations" of the
sponsors of anti-gay referenda); MICHAEL NAvA & ROBERT DAWIDOFF, CREATED
EQUAL: WHY GAY RIGHTS MATrER TO AMERICA 26 (1994) ("In effect, gay men
and women are taught that their experience of themselves as decent,
productive, loving humans is false, because homosexuality is unnatural and
sinful."); cf RicHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 291 (1992) (describing
religious opposition to recognition of gay and lesbian rights in "Western culture
since Christ").
3. Note, supra note 1, at 1915 (describing, and refuting, anti-gay
argument that "gay people threaten family values"); see also NAvA & DAWIDOFF,
supra note 2, at 24 (describing the anti-gay position that "extending civil rights
to gays and lesbians . . . would undermine the family," and arguing that this
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homosexuals (particularly gay men) are responsible for the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases, especially AIDS,4 and that
gays are disproportionately likely to be pedophiles.5
These are all social, political and moral arguments, not
directly legal. ones, though they are meant to influence the sub-
stance of the law. More recently, the supporters of measures like
Oregon's Proposition 9 and Colorado's Amendment 2 have
made effective use6 of the argument that civil rights protections
are "special rights" which should not be extended to lesbians and
gay men.
position 'ignores the fact that "in our system the individual, and not the
heterosexual family, is the unit of citizenship").
4. Note, supra note 1, at 1915 (anti-gay forces argue that "gay people area
threat to the public health"). (
. . 5. Id. (noting argument that "gay people threaten children," but pointing
out that evidence shows that "gay people are no more likely to molest children
than are heterosexuals"); NAvA & DAWIDOFF, supra note 2, at 37 (quoting anti-
gay group as saying, "The homosexual life-style is based on the recruitment and
exploitation of vulnerable young males").
6. Oregon's Proposition 9 lost at the polls, while Colorado's Amendment
2 passed by a margin of 53-47%. SeeJohn F. Niblock, Anii-Gay Initiatives: A Call
For Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REv. 153, 154 & n.5 (1993).
Regardless of which side won in either state, it is clear that the "special rights"
argument carried considerable weight for the anti-gay forces. See NAVA &
DAWIDOFF, supra note 2, at 68 ("the lack of overt bigotry in [Amendment 2's]
language, and the insertion'of the buzzwords 'quota preferences,' allowed its
backers to maintain that the purpose of the law was simply to prevent
homosexuals from enjoying 'special rights.' "); Jeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative
Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A Proposal for True Equality of Opportunity and
Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POL'V REv. 47, 73 & n.110 (1993) ("Though
misleading, the rhetoric of 'special rights' was used effectively by Amendment
2's proponents."). It was, it appears, well-suited to public opinion on questions
regarding sexual orientation. Polls have shown that the fault line in public
opinion is between "tolerating" gays and lesbians, and "approving" of
homosexuality in areas involving "family values," which most Americans refuse
to do. See Poll Finds Voters Unpredictable WASH. BLADE, May 13, 1994, at 29
(reporting poll showing that over 70 percent of respondents believed gays and
lesbians should have access to jobs, housing, and public accommodations, but
that 60 percent were opposed to allowing gays to marry or adopt or raise
children). Once the rights sought by lesbians and gays are successfully
characterized as "special rights," support for such measures can easily be
portrayed as "approving" the so-called "gay lifestyle."7. See Note, supra note 1, at 1905 & n.4 ("Recently, rallying against the
establishment of 'special rights,' some right-wing, fundamentalist Christian
groups have embarked on extensive campaigns to curtail the civil rights of
lesbians and gay men."). This rhetoric resurfaced when Congress opened
debate on S. 2238, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994 (ENDA), a
bill introduced by Senator Kennedy to bar discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. See infra note II (describing provisions of ENDA). At a July 29,
1994 hearing of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, one
opponent of the legislation argued that gays are members of an "elite whose
"SPECIAL RIGHTS" CANARD .
This essay will dissect the notion of "special rights." Part I
will attempt to define precisely what the anti-gay. forces mean
when they employ the "special rights" rhetoric, concluding that
their only possible rational meaning is that civil rights protec-
tions of the type that have been subject to referenda should not
be thought of as "rights" at all, but rather are privileges which the
majority ought not confer on the basis of sexual orientation.
Part II will examine the extent to which this argument ech-
oes the themes sounded by those who opposed the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 on the ground that it conferred "special rights" or
"privileges" because it infringed the liberty-based rights of dis-
criminators to choose with whom to associate. Finally, Part III
will argue that the best answer to the "special rights" argument is
twofold. First, utilizing the same answer to the "special rights"
claim given by the sponsors of the Civil Rights Act, advocates of
lesbian and gay rights should focus on the nature of the rights
protected by an anti-discrimination statute, and argue that the
rights to employment, housing, and use of public accommoda-
tions are fundamental aspects of full, genuine citizenship that
outweigh any claimed freedom to discriminate.
Second, it is also crucial to make the case for extending
those rights specifically to gay men and lesbians, and answer the
morality-based objections of anti-gay forces. To do so, advocates
of gay and lesbian civil rights should argue both that homosexu-
ality is not immoral and that discrimination against gay men and
lesbians is immoral, emphasizing for purposes of the latter point
the argument that sexual orientation is often an immutable,
essential aspect of human personality. These arguments drain
the moral force out of the claimed liberty to discriminate. Fram-
ing the case in this way demonstrates that the "special rights"
claim of anti-gay forces is entirely inconsistent with the modern
conception of civil rights in our polity, so much so that the claim
must be regarded as an irrational appeal to prejudice.
insider status has permitted it to abuse the political process in search, not of
equal opportunity, but of special privilege and public endorsement." Clinton
Administration Backs Bill to Ban Job Bias Against Gays, DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA)
No. 145, at A15 (Aug. 1, 1994) [hereinafter DAILY LABOR REPORT]. Another
witness argued that protecting lesbians and gay men from discrimination
"essentially takes away the rights of employers to decline to hire or promote
someone who openly acknowledges indulging in behavior that the employer or
his customers find immoral, unhealthy and destructive to individuals, families
and societies." Id. (characterizing testimony of Robert H. Knight of the Family
Research Council). I will argue that thisargument against anti-discrimination
laws - that they limit some people's liberty to discriminate in favor of others'
right to equal treatment - is the central notion underlying the special rights
theme. See infra text accompanying notes 20-23.
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I. THE CONTENT OF THE SPECIAL RIGHTS PosrrIToN
Defining precisely what the special rights argument means is
somewhat difficult, both because the phrase itself is somewhat
opaque, and because its proponents are not always consistent in
describing what they mean when they bother with specifics. In
broad terms, the word "special" could have two meanings. First,
it could imply that only a limited group possesses the right in
question; the right is "special" because it is a right not enjoyed by
other groups - and hence ought not be conferred. For exam-
ple, if gay men and lesbians were granted the right to commit
murder, that would be a "special right" in the sense that it is not
possessed by heterosexuals.' Second, they could mean that civil
rights protections are by their nature "special rights" and that
sexual orientation is not a valid basis for these rights. This argu-
ment is twofold: it argues first that the right to be free from
employment discrimination 9 is in some way "special," and second
that while it is valid to confer this "special right" on the basis of
race, sex, or religion, doing so on the basis of sexual orientation
is either unjustified or improper.
The first definition may be rejected rather quickly. The
problem with it is that no proponent of lesbian and gay rights,
and no gay rights ordinance that has been the subject of anti-gay
8. While this meaning is, as I will shortly discuss, not a rational
explanation of the special rights language of. opponents of gay rights
legislation, it does explain the Supreme Court's anti-gay decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), where the Court framed Michael
Hardwick's case as if he was claiming a specific right to engage in "homosexual
sodomy," rather than a general right to privacy common to all Americans. See
Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Prediectio 54 U.
CHi. L. REv. 648, 652 (1987) (arguing that the Court "reframed Hardwick,
converting it from a 'sexual privacy' case to a 'gay rights' case"). In this way, the
Court treated the case as if it claimed a "special right" exclusively for gays.
Justice Blackmun's dissent took the majority to task for its sleight of hand.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("This case is no more about
'a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,' as the Court purports
to declare, . . . than Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), was about a
fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967), was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a
telephone booth. Rather, this case is about 'the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone.'
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).").
9. Throughout this article, I will use employment discrimination as the
paradigm, and discuss forms of discrimination which are specific to
employment law, such as a failure to hire. Use of employment discrimination is
merely meant to ease discussion; the arguments apply with equal force to
housing discrimination, or to discrimination in public accommodations like
restaurants and hotels.
"SPECIAL RIGHTS' CANARD
repeal efforts, has claimed a particular right exclusively on behalf
of lesbians and gays. ° The most typical example is an ordinance
banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Such
laws are neutral on their face, in that they bar the use of any
person's sexual orientation - whether it be gay or straight - as
a basis for an employment decision."1
10. But see Byrne, supra note 6 (arguing for affirmative action which
creates a more open and receptive environment for gay and lesbian
employees). Byrne's proposal, while styled as an argument for 'affirmative
action," is actually quite limited in scope. He does not advocate preferences for
lesbians and gay men for hiring or promotion, but only steps that would create
a work environment where homosexuals can "come out" and flourish on an
equal basis with heterosexuals. Id. at 54-56 (discussing the importance of gays
and lesbians coming out as a necessary step to eliminating anti-gay intolerance).
For example, Byrne says that "it is just and perhaps necessary that employers
seeking to remedy the effects of past discrimination, challenge stereotypes and
prejudice, and foster workforce diversity affirmatively encourage gay and
lesbian employees to come out." Id. at 65. The most extreme step Byrne calls
for is the voluntary adoption of flexible "goals and timetables," see id. at 51,
which he believes would "send the message" that the work atmosphere is gay-
friendly, and force employers to create a gay-positive environment in order to
attract and keep gay and lesbian employees and hence meet their "goals." Id. at
66. 1 accept Byrne's characterization of his proposal as "affirmative action," but
it is a mild version indeed, with very little in it likely to be seen as rights given to
gays and lesbians at the expense of heterosexuals. Byrne himself recognizes
that affirmative action for lesbians and gay men (even his modest proposal)
would be vulnerable to the charge that it constitutes "special rights" or
.preferential treatment." Id. at 72-73 & n. 109.
11. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 151 B, §§ 3-5 (Law Co-op. 1992); MASS.
ANN. LAws, ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (Law Co-op. 1992) (Massachusetts gay rights
law; § 4(1) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate, inter alia, on the
basis of "sexual orientation," while § 3(6) defines "sexual orientation" to mean
",having an orientation for or being identified as having an orientation for
heterosexuality, bisexuality, or homosexuality"). This is also the approach
taken in section 3 of ENDA, which provides that employers "shall not - (1)
subject an individual to different standards or treatment on the basis of sexual
orientation; (2) discriminate against an individual based on the sexual
orientation of persons with whom such individual is believed to associate or to
have associated; or (3) otherwise discriminate against an individual on the basis
of sexual orientation." See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994 as
Introduced June 23, 1994, DAILY LABOR REp. (BNA) No. 120, at DI (June 24,
1994) [hereinafter DAIL LABOR REPORT] (containing text of the bill). Section
18 of ENDA defines "sexual orientation" to include "lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
heterosexual orientation .... " Id. at D3. In addition, Section 5 of ENDA states
that it does not provide a cause of action for employment practices that are
neutral on their face but have a "disparate impact" on the basis of sexual
orientation, and Section 6 bars the use of "a quota on the basis of sexual
orientation" and prohibits "giv[ing] preferential treatment to an individual on
the basis of sexual orientation." These provisions were tailored to preempt the
argument that ENDA would provide "special rights" for lesbians and gay men.
See Employment Bill Puts Real Protections to Work, WASH. BLADE, July 29, 1994, at 37
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It is true that the impetus for passage of these laws is to pro-
tect gay men and lesbians from discrimination, and that the pri-
mary beneficiaries are homosexuals, for the obvious reason that
gays and lesbians are far more often the victims of discrimination
owing to their sexual orientation. 12 But the same is true of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,13 and other civil rights laws.1 4
Passage of these laws, too, was impelled by a primary evil they
were passed to address: race discrimination against a particular
racial group, African-Americans, who were (and remain) far
more often the victims of race discrimination than are whites.15
Nevertheless, Title VII's bar on race discrimination does not
provide "special rights" to African-Americans. If they benefit
more from the protection, it is only because they are more often
the victims of the discrimination that made the protection neces-
sary. The same is true of laws banning sexual orientation dis-
(article by coalition of civil rights leaders supporting ENDA, explaining that by
"neutralizing [the special rights] claim, ENDA is immeasurably strengthened").
12. See S. 2238, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1994) (findings of Congress,
including specific findings that "historically, American society has tended to
isolate, stigmatize, and persecute gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals," and that
"the continuing existence of employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation denies gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals equal opportunity in the
workplace"), reprinted in DAILY LABOR REPORT, supra note 11, at D1.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
14. This is not true of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which does not
bar "mirror image" discrimination. Title VII bars race and gender
discrimination, and the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that this
means discrimination against whites as well as blacks. See McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (holding that Title VII permits
claim of race discrimination against whites). The Supreme Court. has also
recognized that Title VII prohibits discrimination against men as well as
women. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616
(1987) (treating claim of sex discrimination against men as valid under Tide
VII, but rejecting claim in particular case). But the ADA bars discrimination
only against a "qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(1988). This language has been interpreted not to provide a cause of action to
an individual who is discriminated against because she- is not disabled. See
Appell v. Thornburgh, No. Civ. A. 90-2112-1fo, 1991 WL 501641 (D.D.C., May
10, 1991) (under Rehabilitation Act, whose language protects only "individual
with handicaps," person may not challenge alleged discrimination against him
because he was not handicapped); Ortner v. Paralyzed Veterans, 2 A.D. Cases
(BNA) 241, 242-43 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1992) (D.C. Human Rights Act protects
only people with disabilities, because it does not use "neutral" language like
"race" or "sex," but defines the covered class, to include "only those who have a
physical impairment.").
15. See H. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong. 1st Sess., at 18, reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TrrLuS VII AND XI OF CML RIGHTS Acr OF 1964 2018
(1968) (noting that the "[m]ost glaring" form of discrimination "is the
discrimination against Negroes which exists throughout our Nation").
"SPECIAL RIGHTS" CANARD.
crimination. It is hardly a convincing argument for opponents of
gay rights laws to say that a sexual orientation civil. rights law
amounts to "special rights" for lesbians and gays because only
they are discriminated against in the first place. 6
For this same reason, even if a statute was phrased to bar
discrimination against homosexuals, rather than using the neu-
tral phrasing which bars the use of sexual orientation as a basis, it
would not confer "special rights" not enjoyed by heterosexuals.
Similar terminology is found in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which guarantees to all persons "the same right. . to make and
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens."17 Obvi-
ously, this language provides no rights to white citizens; the right
it confers necessarily is bestowed upon non-whites exclusively.
That is, it would make no sense to say that white citizens are
granted the "right" to enjoy the same rights as white citizens.
Granted, the substance of the right involved cannot be consid-
ered preferential for non-whites, since it is by its terms only the
right to be treated on a par with whites. Nevertheless, at that
time there was no need for whites to be assured of the right to
make and enforce contracts, since "whites simply did not face
parties who were unwilling to contract with them because of their
16. Nevertheless, Professor Richard Duncan has argued that "when
proponents of homosexual fights legislation argue that they are seeking
nothing more than the same civil rights everyone else has, they are wrong,"
essentially because homosexuals "already have the same right everyone else has,
i.e., the right to be protected against discrimination on the basis of their race,
gender, religion, and other protected categories." Richard F. Duncan, Who
Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious
Freedom, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 393, 400 (1994). The flaw in Duncan's
simplistic argument is obvious. The reason for an anti-discrimination law is that
members of a given group face discrimination on a particular basis; the fact that
they have protection from discrimination on.other bases is irrelevant to the need
(or justification) for adding the proposed basis.. Professor Duncan's argument
is just as true applied to African-Americans in the days before the Civil Rights
Act of 1964: they had the same right to be free of racial discrimination as whites
- to wit, -no right at all. The point, however, was that the absence of the
protection had a far different effect on African-Americans, because they
actually faced the discrimination. Professor Duncan distinguishes race from
sexual orientation as a valid basis for anti-discrimination protection because
race "is a morally neutral characteristic." Id at 403. I address morality-based
opposition to civil rights protections for lesbians and gay men in Part III-C; see
infra text accompanying notes 80-108.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). For a discussion of the history of § 1981, see
Donald R. Livingston & Samuel A. Marcosson, The Court at the Crossroads:
Runyon, Section 1981, and The Meaning of Preceden4 37 EMORY LJ. 949, 953-60
(1988) (arguing that § 1981 has historical roots both in the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the Voting Rights Act of 1870).
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race."18 In short, only non-whites were being granted anything
new. The same would be true of a statute barring anti-gay dis-
crimination, whether it was worded to prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination in general, or discrimination against homosexuals
in particular. The point would be to create a level playing field
in which neither gays nor straights would be discriminated
against on the basis of their sexual orientation.
In conclusion, the intended meaning of the "special rights"
rhetoric is not to claim that gays and lesbians are seeking rights of
a type or scope beyond those enjoyed by other Americans. 9
Rather, if anything more than sloganeering is intended, it must
be the second possible meaning: that anti-discrimination laws
generally confer "special rights," and that they should not be
extended to lesbians and gay men.
II. CIVIL RIGHTS AS SPECIAL RIGHTS: REFIGHTING AN OLD WAR
Hence, it is necessary to turn to the second meaning of "spe-
cial rights" - that civil rights protections are "special" by their
nature, and that sexual orientation is not a basis upon which they
should be extended. The first part of this argument is really an
old claim, revived for application to a new era. The second part,
as discussed in Part III, is the real heart of the battle over civil
rights for lesbians and gays.
The idea that anti-discrimination laws confer "special rights"
is not new. To the contrary, opponents of prior civil rights legis-
lation have argued consistently that, in granting a right to be free
of discrimination on a particular basis, such laws infringe on the
18. See Livingston & Marcosson, supra note 17, at 963 & n.62.
19. Perhaps this line of reasoning gives too much credit to the anti-gay
forces utilizing the special rights rhetoric. It may be that they truly mean to
suggest that citizens ought to reject statutes barring anti-gay discrimination
because they give preferential treatment to gay men and lesbians, even if the
argument is completely false and irrational. And, indeed, they have falsely
implied that such laws would require "affirmative action" and "quotas" for
homosexuals. See supra note 6. If, however, I am wrong to dispense with this
possible interpretation of the intended meaning of the special rights rhetoric,
then it is only because its intended meaning is irrational, and I have
accomplished my goal of showing that the entire argument does not constitute
a rational argument against gay rights laws. Ironically, it is this irrational
meaning of the "special rights" rhetoric that may constitute its greatest popular
appeal. Certainly, the sections of ENDA which bar "quotas," "preferential
treatment" and disparate impact, see supra note 11, implicitly assume is that it is
necessary to counter this message of anti-gay forces. While "special rights"
rhetoric has political resonance in conjuring up the "hot button" social issues of
affirmative action and quotas, it should not be accepted as a rational basis for
anti-gay measures.
"SPECIAL RIGHTS" CANARD
corresponding freedom of others to engage in that type of dis-
crimination.2" Because recognizing the right to be free of private
discrimination is, under this view, a zero-sum game, 21 the govern-
ment is choosing to favor the equality-based right of one person
over the liberty-based right of another - conferring a "special
right" for the former.2
20. Essentially the same argument has been made by reference to
common law notions such as, in the employment context, the employment-at-
will doctrine. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws 148 (1992) (arguing that "Title VII thus
works a major shift from the paradigmatic and most common version of an
employment contract, the contract at will"); Duncan, supra note 16, at 400
(framing anti-discrimination laws as "exceptions to the general rule of free
choice"). When made in this way, the argument takes a slightly different form,
that anti-discrimination provisions confer "special" rights because they depart
from common law principles. But the substance of the argument is really the
same, because the underlying justification for the at-will doctrine is to preserve
the employer's autonomy (and, at least nominally, that of the worker as well) in
employment decisions. Id. at 399. It thus reduces to the same question:
whether we will allow discrimination for the sake of preserving the freedom -
under the at-will doctrine - to discriminate.
21. See Charles L Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69
YALE LJ. 421, 429 (1960) ("When the directive of equality cannot be followed
without displeasing... white [s], then something that can be called a 'freedom'
of... white[s] must be impaired. If the [F]ourteenth [A] mendment commands
equality, and if segregation violates equality, then the status of the reciprocal
'freedom' is automatically settled."). Judge Robert Bork's articulation of this
view of anti-discrimination laws was one source of criticism of him during the
bitter confirmation battle over his nomination to the Supreme Court. He had
expressed the "zero-sum" view in a 1963 article opposing the Civil Rights Act,
calling the position that whites should be compelled to open their places of
business to black customers "a principle of unsurpassed ugliness." 133 CONG.
REc. 514841 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy quoting
Bork's article). Although he later recanted his opposition to the Act, Judge
Bork expressed the same underlying perspective on civil rights as an
infringement on others' freedom in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Id. at 514922 (statement of Sen. Levin quoting from a colloquy
between Judge Bork and Senator Simon, and from a 1985 statement by Bork).
The only matter about which Judge Bork apparently changed his mind was
whether the infringement was justified.
22. This argument has no force, however, when the right asserted is for
equal treatment by the government. For example, if a hypothetical anti-gay
initiative sought to strip homosexuals of the right to vote, the argument
described in the text could not be advanced; no one else's freedom is
circumscribed if lesbians and gays can vote. There are many other rights
sought by lesbians and gays, such as the right to marry, to engage in private,
consensual sexual conduct, and to adopt children, which also involve only
conduct by government vis-a-vis homosexuals, and do not involve the regulation
of private conduct motivated by anti-gay bias. Since the immediate target of
Colorado's Amendment 2 was local ordinances barring private anti-gay
discrimination, it is plausible that its supporters intended their "special rights"
argument to mean that antidiscrimination laws confer "special rights." It is
19951
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The evidence that this is actually what opponents of gay and
lesbian rights laws mean, rather than what they must mean if they
have a rational basis at all, is somewhat thin. A recent article by
Richard Duncan, however, makes explicit the argument that gay
rights should be opposed because they infringe the liberty to dis-
criminate, at least for those with religious beliefs against homo-
sexuality.2" Insofar as this asserted right to discriminate
represents the basis for regarding civil right protections in gen-
eral as "special rights," Professor Duncan has made the claim
important to note, however, that the forward-looking aspect of Amendment 2,
which tried to bar the enactment of any future gay and lesbian rights legislation
via the normal political process, was an attempt to abridge the right of lesbians
and gay men (and heterosexuals who support gay rights measures) to full and
equal participation in the political process. Recognizing this fundamental right
did not impair any corresponding freedom of those who wished to
discriminate. It was on this basis that Amendment 2 was struck down as
unconstitutional. Evans v. Romer, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 753, 759
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993), aff'd, 63 U.S.L.W. 2219 (Colo. Oct. 11, 1994)
("Amendment 2 is unconstitutional as being violative of the fundamental right
of an identifiable group to participate in the political process .... ."). As I note
shortly, the "special rights" argument used to oppose the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was not raised against those sections of the Act, such as the voting rights
provisions of Title I, which did not limit private citizens' rights to discriminate.
See infra text accompanying note 36.
23. Duncan, supra note 16, at 397-98 ("When a legislature acts to protect
homosexual behavior under anti-discrimination laws, it elevates homosexual
practices to the status of protected activities while at the same time branding
many mainstream religious institutions and individuals as outlaws engaged in
antisocial and immoral behavior."). It is ironic that Professor Duncan defends
religiously-motivated discriminators on the ground that they should not be held
to be "engaged in antisocial and immoral behavior," when the whole basis for
their discrimination is the desire to brand others as being "engaged in antisocial
and immoral behavior." Similarly, there is rich irony in his statement that
government should not force "religiously-motivated individuals.. .. merely...
trying to live out their faith" to refrain from discriminating against gay men and
lesbians because "it is illegitimate for a political majority 'to use the power of
government to express its moral values by stigmatizing another group.' " Id. at
443 n.220-222 (quoting Kenneth L. Karst, Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural
Counterrevolution in Constitutional Perspective, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 677, 729
(1991)). Professor Duncan states that he believes the case "could be made in
support of sodomy laws" that "homosexuality is immoral, harmful, or
unnatural." Duncan, supra note 16, at 405 & n.42. By citing the "wise
observation" that homosexual conduct is outside" 'the very core of that
morality by which civilization is constituted,' " id. at 405 n.42 (quoting HARRY V.
JAFFA, HOMOSEXUALrTY AND THE NATURAL LAw 35 (1990)), as a basis for sodomy
laws, Professor Duncan does the very thing he terms "illegitimate": he defends
the use of "the power of government" to express the "moral values" of the anti-
gay "political majority" to "stigmatize another group" - homosexuals. See also
infra text accompanying notes 106-08 (discussing anti-gay moral arguments as a
"jurisprudence of insult").
"SPECIAL RIGHTS" CANARD
with specific reference to the battle over lesbian and gay rights
legislation.
In examining the use of this rhetoric by opponents of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, one may fairly question how much is
accomplished by showing that. the anti-gay arguments of the
1990s closely resemble the anti-civil rights arguments of the
1960s. For one thing, there is evidence that even those who char-
acterize anti-discrimination laws protecting lesbians and gay men
as "special rights" intend this less as a rational argument than as a
sound bite.24 It thus might be more useful to engage them on
this simplistic level than to parse, analyze, and compare their
arguments to earlier, now discredited appeals. Granted that this
point has some force, it is also true that the very effectiveness of
"special rights" as a sound bite25 makes it worth debunking and
delegitimizing at every possible level.
It is also true that anti-gay forces can respond to the similar-
ity between their arguments and those of the opponents of the
Civil Rights Act by saying that the arguments were right, but were
simply employed in the wrong cause. In other words, they could
say that the moral and/or political case for ending racial discrim-
ination was so strong that it overwhelmed any concerns about
whether "special rights" were being enacted, but that does not
forever invalidate the "special rights" argument when it is applied
to other (read: lesser) causes.
That is completely correct; no matter how crucial the right
to ajob may be, it is still necessary tojustify the basis on which the
right is protected. 26 It is, in other words, necessary to show that
anti-gay forces are not only wrong about the rights involved, but
also about the matter of extending them to lesbians and gay
men. However, acknowledging the need to take the second step
does not reduce the importance of the first.27
The history lesson on which this article intends to embark is
also worthwhile for a number of other reasons. First, advocates
24. See Note, supra note 1, at 1909 n.35 (quoting letter by board member
of Colorado for Family Values stating, "I believe 'No Special Privileges' is a good
motto for the amendment's public campaign, but I fear the possible legal
ramifications if it is included in the amendment itself.").
25. See Employment Bill Puts Real Protections to Work, supra note 11 ("One of
the most potent weapons in the arsenal of those who oppose equal rights for
Gay people is that bills like ENDA accord Gays 'special rights.' ").
26. See infra text accompanying notes 110-39 (urging use of the argument
that sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic in arguing for laws
against anti-gay discrimination).
27. See infta text accompanying notes 46-51 (explaining why the answer
provided by Civil Rights Act proponents to the "special rights" position is useful
in the debate today).
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of civil rights for lesbians and gay men have been accused of
appropriating - or misappropriating - the African-American
experience by comparing the case for gay civil rights to that of
the racial civil rights movement."8 It is thus worth showing that
the opponents of civil rights protections for gays are using the
same arguments as the opponents of the Civil Rights Act, for it
validates the use of the successful responsive rhetoric employed by
the Act's proponents.'.
Second, it is true that the mere fact that an argument was
used at one time in the service of a now-unpopular cause does
not make the argument itself illegitimate. Nevertheless, the fact
that it was used in that time and place, and in that cause, is
instructive of the assumptions and mindsets reflected in the argu-
ment. That is, it surely is not irrelevant that the diehard oppo-
nents of the Civil Rights Act, the Russell Longs and the Strom
Thurmonds, conceptualized the freedom from discrimination as
a "special right" and as an assault on the treasured "right" to dis-
criminate. The burden should be on those who would, today,
conceptualize gays' and lesbians' freedom from discrimination in
the same way to explain why they are not merely the Longs and
Thurmonds of today. If they object to the association because
the cause for which those men fought is now considered illegiti-
mate and even offensive, perhaps they should rethink their
cause, and consider how their arguments will be viewed thirty
years hence.
Finally, examining the rhetoric of both sides in the 1964
debate provides a fresh insight into the extraordinarily different
perspective regarding the nature of rights that each side brought
to the argument. The sponsors of the Civil Rights Act offered
the nation a rich, full vision of what it means to be a citizen and
the extent of the rights citizenship affords. Articulated today,
this vision can add a powerful voice to the debate over discrimi-
nation against gays and lesbians.
28. See, e.g., NAVA & DAWIDOFF, supra note 2, at 19-20 (acknowledging the
common feeling that the gay and lesbian movement - and other aspiring civil
rights movements - are appropriating [the black civil rights movement's]
rhetoric and moral claim," but arguing that "the special character of race within
this society and of the civil rights movement that grew out of it cannot preempt
other movements for civil rights"). I respond to this accusation infra note 77.
Joe Rogers, Spare Us the Comparisons Between Gays and Blacks, WAsH. TIMEs, July
29, 1994, at A21 (arguing that "[t]he comparison has been made so often that
when talking about the subject, one almost always hears 'discrimination against
homosexuals is no different than discrimination against blacks.' ").
29. See infra text accompanying notes 46-67 (advocating use of arguments
made by sponsors of the Civil Rights Act).
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Opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 argued that it
would "infringe[ ] upon the rights of private property and the
rights of American citizens to choose their associates." ° Still
more strikingly parallel to today's anti-gay rhetoric were Senator
Hill's comments:
Under a misleading banner labeled "equal opportunity,"
proponents of H.R. 7152 would have the Congress enact
what in fact and substance is "the Special Privilege Act of
1963." For rights won at the expense of others' rights are
not rights at all, but special privileges .... History aptly
demonstrates that special privilege for one group can but
result in a limitation of liberty and a denial of rights for
others.3'
The Southern Senators filibustering the Act opposed Title VII as
an illegitimate exercise of government power to curtail employ-
ers' freedom to hire whomever they like for a job,3 2 and criti-
cized Title II (the public accommodations provision) for
infringing on the right of operators of hotels and other such
facilities to accept or reject customers on whatever basis they
chose, and to associate with whomever they chose."3 Similar sen-
30. 110 CONG. REc. 4744 (1964) (statement of Sen. Russell).
31. Id. at 4760 (statement of Sen. Hill). See also id. at 5007 (statement of
Sen. Ellender that the public accommodations provision would "make it the
special right of one class of citizens to have their interests looked after by the
Federal Government,' and... take away from other classes the right to associate
with persons of their own choosing").
32. Id. (statement of Sen. Hill that Civil Rights Act would cost business
owner the loss of "the right to hire and fire whom he pleases in his own
business"); id. at 4762 (statement of Sen. Hill that "I am opposed to telling
businessmen how they may use their private property and whom they may hire
and fire"); id. at 4764 (statement of Sen. Ervin that Tide VII "rob[s] the
employer . . . of the right of determining how he can best assign his own
employees to the performance of the work which they were employed to do");
id. at 5093 (statement of Sen. Robertson that Title VII "would be an
unwarranted invasion of private enterprise and private property rights").
33. Id. at 4762 (statement of Sen. Hill that public accommodations
provision would "stifle the very spirit of the American free enterprise system"
because it would "deny the owners of these establishments the right to choose
their own customers .... (and] deny to owners of business establishments the
right to use their own private property as they desire"); id. at 4818 (statement of
Sen. Stennis that, under the Civil Rights Act, property owners "would be
divested of their long-recognized right to enjoy and utilize their private
property as they see fit and of their right to serve or refuse to serve whomsoever
they please," and that these rights "are fundamental and they cannot be
destroyed or impaired by the Federal Government under the guise of
protecting the real or fancied rights of other individuals"); id. at 4825
(statement of Sen. Stennis that "[t]he bill is a direct invasion of personal,
individual and human rights"); id. at 4853 (statement of Sen. Sparkman that
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timents appear in the minority views sections of the relevant
House committee report. Clearly, today's anti-gay "special
rights" rhetoric is not a new phenomenon, but an echo of past
opposition to civil rights. 5
Title II is "the most far-reaching attempt to repeal the constitutional concept of
individual liberty that has been proposed since the cruel period of
Reconstruction"); id. at 4854 (statement of Sen. Long that "the right of a citizen
to choose those with whom he associates . . . [is] one of the basic and
fundamental freedoms of an individual"); id. at 5007 (statement of Sen.
Ellender that "title II represents a massive assault on the private enterprise
system and the concurrent rights of private property that have made it possible
for this Nation to be developed into the strongest in the world"); id. at 5085
(statement of Sen. Robertson that "[w]hat we are considering is the human
rights of the owner of property to use it to promote his own interests, as
compared with the human rights of another individual who does not own
property but wants to use it against the interests of the man who does"); id. at
5230 (statement of Sen. Long that "every man of white Caucasian heritage has a
perfect right to protect those institutions in his society which allow him the
freedom to associate with people of his own race"); id. at 5248 (statement of
Sen. Talmadge that Title II attacked "that conduct of man which falls outside
the realm of law and comes instead from his right to be master of his own life
and property").
Along with defending the right of the owner of the business to choose his
customers, opponents of Tide II also spoke of the right of customers to choose to
patronize a segregated restaurant or hotel, a right they could no longer exercise
if no such facilities were permitted. See id. at 4766 (statement of Sen. Hill
defending right of "Mr. Smith... [to] select a restaurant serving only a single
race," and decrying Title II because it "would deprive Mr. Smith and his friends
and millions of Americans this choice and their freedom of association"); id. at
4826 (statement of Sen. Long that, under Title. II, "would not the whites be
denied the privilege of being served with others of their own kind -2 assuming
that is what they would like?"); id. at 5231 (statement of Sen. Long that Title II
"forces the social presence of the Negro race upon scores of millions who
object to it and those constitutional rights of privacy and property are being
totally disregarded and trampled upon"); id. at 5466 (statement of Sen. Long
that "[i]f the law is so written that a person has nowhere else to go where he can
be among his own kind, as a practical matter, has he not been denied
association with people of his own kind?").
34. See H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 15, at 64-65, LEGISLATIVE HISToRY at
2064-65 (arguing that "the bill, under the cloak of protecting the civil rights of
certain minorities, will destroy civil rights of all citizens of the United States who
fall within its scope"). The Minority Report also explicitly advanced the "zero-
sum" view of civil rights, saying that "it must be remembered that when
legislation is enacted designed to benefit one segment or class of society, the
usual result is the destruction of coexisting rights of the remainder of that
society. One freedom is destroyed by governmental action to enforce another
freedom." Id. at 2068.
35. That is why, as Professor Jane Schacter has pointed out, "the very
rhetoric of special rights is heavily coded with the most powerful symbols and
ideas of backlash against all civil rights law." Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil
Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HAtv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 283, 300 (1994). The concepts that underlie the ".special rights" notion
SPECIAL RIGHTS" CANARD
Significantly, however, the "special rights" and "special privi-
leges" rhetoric was absent during debate over Title I, the voting
rights section of the Civil Rights Act. Since guaranteeing a citi-
zen's right to vote, or fully participate in the political process,
does not directly impinge on any reciprocal freedom of other
citizens, opponents confined their remarks to making a federal-
ism argument, defending the rights of the states against federal
usurpation.36
The civil rights-as-special rights position has also been
reflected, in a slightly different context, in judicial opinions. For
example, in Peterson v. Greenville,7 which raised the question of
whether there was state action underlying the exclusion of Afri-
can-American diners from segregated, privately-owned restau-
rants; Justice Harlan's opinion38 explained his view of the
in the public mind - especially affirmative action and quotas as remedies -
do not apply only to gay rights laws; they are just as applicable, and thus just as
much a threat, to every application of the anti-discrimination principle. Id. at
302 ("The concept of 'special rights' is potent precisely because it appeals to
the deepest public fears about civil rights law and remedies .... [The term]
reflect[s] a deep resevoir of antagonism toward civil rights laws and, in turn,
reif[ies] and intensif[ies] that antagonism.").
Beyond the "special rights" parallel, there is another way in which the anti-
gay arguments of today bear no small resemblance to the anti-civil rights
arguments of 30 years ago. As I have noted, the -religious right has relied
extensively on the notion that homosexuality is "unnatural" and/or "immoral."
See supra text accompanying notes 2-5; see also NAVA & DAWIDOFF, supra note 2, at
46-47 (arguing that the religious anti-gay characterization of homosexuality as
unnatural is "a way of authenticating their own views about proper human
behavior"). Similarly, in 1964 opponents of the Civil Rights Act spoke of
"natural law" as teaching that separation of the races is correct and appropriate,
intimating that integration and non-discrimination is "unnatural." See, e.g., 110
CONG. REc. 5239 (1964) (statement of Sen. Long that "[m]any of us believe that
racial preference, racial separation, and racial segregation are part of the law of
nature that has come down through the centuries"). Evidently, it is not enough
for opponents of a group's civil rights protections simply to argue that they are
right on policy grounds; they must also demonize the group, or association with
the group, as "unnatural."
36. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 4997-5005 (1964) (remarks of Sens. Ellender
and Ervin); id. at 4852 (statement of Sen. Sparkman that "Congress is not
authorized to prohibit literacy or other tests which apply to all voters. This is
the right of the States and not the Congress."); id. at 5083 (statement of Sen.
Robertson that "[t ] he Federal Government should not be injecting itself into an
area which has historically and logically been the sole function of the several
States").
37. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
38. Justice Harlan concurred in the result in Peterson, and dissented in
each of its companion cases, in which the evidence of what he believed was
sufficient state action was lacking. See Peterson, 373 U.S. at 249 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in the result).
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importance of maintaining the strict state action requirement for
finding a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment:
This limitation [to state action] on the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment serves several vital functions in
our system. Underlying the cases involving an alleged
denial of equal protection by an ostensibly private action is
a clash of competing constitutional claims of a high order:
liberty and equality. Freedom of the individual to choose
his associates or neighbors, to use and dispose of his prop-
erty as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious,
even unjust in his personal relations are things all entitled
to a large measure of protection from governmental inter-
ference. This liberty would be overridden, in the name of
equality, if the strictures of the Amendment were applied
to governmental and private action without distinction.3
9
Nor has this argument been completely consigned to the
scrapheap of yesteryear's intellectual musings and judicial con-
currences. Professor Richard Epstein has argued that employ-
ment discrimination laws should all be repealed as an undue
interference with the autonomy principle underlying the free-
dom of contract.' The "free association" argument as a defense
of the right to discriminate, so prominent in the arguments of
the southern opponents of the Civil Rights Act, is echoed in
Epstein's rhetoric.4" Importantly, however, Epstein concedes
that in advancing this argument he swims against a powerful tide
of social consensus which regards the basic norm of anti-discrimi-
nation - putting to one side more controversial extensions of
the principle such as affirmative action and disparate impact -
as fundamental.4" As he puts it, "In this book I advance a posi-
tion, that is well outside the mainstream of American political
thought."43
39. Id. at 250 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
40. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 3 (explicitly urging "outright rejection of
the anti-discrimination principle in private employment" and "repeal of Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act").
41. Id. at 505 ("The root difficulty of the statute is that it maintains that a
qualified norm of forced association is better than a strong norm of freedom of
association.").
42. Id. at 3-5 (describing the "unchallenged social acceptance of the anti-
discrimination principle," and noting that none of even the most controversial
Supreme Court decisions in 1989 seen as limiting employment discrimination
rights "challenges, or even questions, the basic anti-discrimination principle,
now embodied in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act").
43. Id. at 6.
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"Special rights" rhetoric is not unique to the anti-gay cam-
paigns of the 1990s. It was a primary element of the opposition
to the Civil Rights Act,44 and remains as a fundamental premise
of those who are still unconvinced of its merits. Obviously, how-
ever, this view did not carry the day in 1964.41 The questions,
44. Given the clarity of this rhetoric, it is perplexing that Richard Mohr
claims that, in the debates, "no one advanced arguments of a libertarian stripe:
no one claimed that it was not a proper function of government to coerce what
business might do by limiting their ability to decide whom to hire and serve."
RicHARD D. MOHR, GAys/JuSTICE 138 (1988) (footnote omitted). As I have
shown, many Southern Senators made precisely this claim. Mohr is correct that
the argument "was inconsistent with the obstructionist states' rights ploy, which
implied that states might indeed properly pass such laws, just not the federal
government." ld. Nevertheless, the inconsistency between their "special rights"
argument and their support of state and municipal laws requiring segregation
did not keep Civil Rights Act opponents from making the "libertarian"
argument. They were, in fact, challenged on the inconsistency. See, e.g., 110
CONG. REC. 4767-68 (Senator Humphrey asking Senator Hill whether, if the
Civil Rights Act "would be an infringement on the economic freedom of the
individual," it would also be true that "a law which provided that the facilities in
a restaurant [must] be segregated" was also "an infringement on his freedom").
When challenged, they usually conceded that it was no more legitimate for
states or cities to require discrimination than it was for the federal government
to prohibit it. See i& (Sen. Hill responding that "the owner or operator of the
restaurant should be free to operate it as he thought best for himself").
45. A somewhat more sophisticated version of the "special rights"
position would essentially combine two different arguments made by opponents
of gay rights laws. This argument would posit (at least implicitly) that the
bundle of liberty rights possessed by individuals in their private decision-making
has already been significantly reduced by existing civil rights laws. See supra text
accompanying notes 20-23 (articulating zero-sum vision of civil rights
protections). Given this status quo, the claim would be that we should be
especially wary of any additional equality-based infringements on liberty,
because the trade-off has now tilted (or is in danger of tilting) inappropriately
over to the equality side. In economic terms, the marginal utility gained by a
small incremental gain in equality is outweighed by the loss in the few (and
therefore precious) remaining liberty rights we possess. In practice, this
argument would either (1) roll back anti-discrimination protections, as
Professor Epstein suggests, supra text accompanying notes 40-43, (2) "freeze"
anti-discrimination protections at their current levels, or (3) at the very least
require any "new" group seeking anti-discrimination protections to show that its
claim is as strong as other, already protected groups - a showing anti-gay
forces have already argued lesbians and gays cannot make. See supra note 28
and infra note 77 (discussing argument that case for gay and lesbian civil rights
is not as strong as the case for African-American civil rights).
My basic answer to this argument is twofold. First, the substantive rights
protected by anti-discrimination laws are so central to our modern conception
of full citizenship that we do not, and should not, accord legitimacy to the
competing claim to infringe those rights. See infra text accompanying notes 52-
67 (discussing citizenship-based arguments of advocates of Civil Rights Act of
1964 and their application to gay rights movement). Returning (for a moment)
to the economic jargon, the importance of these rights gives them sufficient
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then, are what proved to be an effective answer to the "special
rights" claim, whether that answer can be utilized as effectively
today, and whether additional answers can and should be
brought to bear.
III. THE NEW (AND REAL) BATrLEGROUND: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AS A BASIS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
PROTECrIONS
A. The Need to Understand History's Answer to the
"Special Rights" Strategy
Before examining the answer given to the "special rights"
argument of the 1960si a brief explanation of why this is a useful
strategy may be in order. After all, as discussed earlier, the fact
that the "special rights" argument was rejected in favor of the
rights recognized in the Civil Rights Act does not establish that it
should also be rejected in favor of recognizing those rights where
sexual orientation is concerned.4" Taking that step requires an
answer to the anti-gay argument that sexual orientation is not a
valid basis for civil rights protections because homosexuality is
evil - an argument that proponents of ending racial discrimina-
tion obviously did not face.
Nevertheless, the 1960s answer to "special rights" is relevant
because it "raises the stakes" of the debate. That is, in order to
effectively counter the "special rights" rhetoric, essentially two
points need to be made. The claim that gays and lesbians in par-
ticular are entitled to protection from discrimination is the second
of these. Before that case is made, however, advocates of lesbian
and gay civil rights must lay the foundation by reestablishing the
profound importance of the rights that are at stake. For this first
task, the rhetoric of the sponsors of the Civil Rights Act could not
be more well-suited.
There is also another, more general reason to utilize the
rhetoric of the Civil Rights Act's sponsors, which is that the argu-
ments made thus far against the "special rights" position have not
been persuasive. To the contrary, anti-gay forces have often suc-
ceeded in their efforts either to block legislative measures
designed to end anti-gay discrimination or to repeal those laws
when they have passed. The horrendous outcome of the fight
utility that the value of protecting them against any particular type of
discrimination outweighs the value we accrue from permitting ourselves the
liberty to discriminate. Second, it is not necessary to compare infringements in
order to justify extension of civil rights laws. These arguments are set forth
more fully later; see infra note 77 and accompanying text.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
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over gays in the military,47 the success of Colorado's Amendment
2, the repeal of the Austin, Texas, domestic partner ordinance,
and the Hawaii legislature's passage of a bill49 disavowing the
Hawaii Supreme Court's decision to force the state to provide a
compelling interest in barring same-sex marriage5" - these and
other events demonstrate the need for something more.51 Since
the arguments made by the proponents of the Civil Rights Act
remain the most cogent and compelling case for limiting the
rights of one group in favor of those of another, it seems to me
that we can only profit by reminding ourselves of the content of
that case.
B. Hubert Humphrey and the Meaning of a Fuller Citizenship
Thus we return to the 1964 debates, this time to examine
the arguments marshalled by the proponents of the Civil Rights
Act, especially its leading champion in the crucial battle to break
the Senate filibuster, Hubert Humphrey. Their argument
against the "special rights" position was quite clear: the rights
47. Lest anyone continue to regard the "don't ask, don't tell" policy as
progress, the early returns show that vesting commanders with discretion
whether to initiate investigations of persons suspected of being gay or engaging
in homosexual acts has had the predictable result of providing a firm basis for
the witch hunts which were supposed to be eliminated by the change. See Eric
Schmitt, Gay Troops Say the Revised Policy is Often Misused, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
1994, at Al ("[A]dvocates for homosexual rights and homosexual service
members interviewed around the country say a number of commanders are
misusing the broad new authority granted under the policy to ferret out
homosexuals."); Lincoln Caplan, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" - Marine Style,
NEWSWEEK, June 13, 1994, at 28 (describing Marine Corps enforcement of new
policy, including pressuring soldiers to "name other marines rumored to be
gay," as showing that "the new rules are not much different from the old ones").
48. See Sam H. Jerhover, Texas Capital Ends Benefits For Partners, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 1994, at A8 (reporting vote by a 62-38% margin to repeal policy
providing health insurance benefits to "domestic partners" of homosexual and
other unmarried city employees).
49. See Peter Freiberg, Hawaii Governor Signs Anti-Gay Mamiage Bill, WASH.
BLADE, July 1, 1994, at 20.
50. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
51. On the other hand, other recent news from the political battleground
is more encouraging. Of ten statewide drives that were underway to collect
signatures to put anti-gay initiatives on ballots for the November 1994 elections,
only two, in Oregon and Idaho, were successful. See Only Two States Will Be
Battling Ballot Measures, WASH. BLADE, July 15, 1994, at 1. Perhaps more
importantly, both of these measures were defeated in close votes. See Lisa M.
Keen, Initiatives in Oregon, Idaho Appear Defeated, WASH. BLADE, Nov. 11, 1994, at
1. Still, the closeness of these votes indicates the need for a more effective
response to the anti-gay message, especially since the proponents of these
initiatives continue to emphasize the "special rights" rhetoric-to the point of
distributing an anti-gay video in Idaho entitled "Gay Rights/Special Rights." Id.
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not to be denied a job, or a place to sleep at night while on the
road, are not "special rights" at all, but fundamental rights that
should be guaranteed by law to all Americans.52 In other words,
the sponsors of the Act asked America to treat the right to a job,
to purchase a home or rent an apartment, and to utilize public
accommodations, as fundamental elements of a citizen's full par-
ticipation in civic life, to which they were entitled because of
their status as citizens.53
Recognizing the importance of these rights provides the best
answer to the zero-sum conception of civil rights which underlies
the special rights claim.5 4 While it is possible, as Professor Black
understood, to always interpose a "freedom" to infringe any right
as trumping the right, there are some rights considered so cru-
cial that we do not conceive of, or at least we accord no legiti-
macy to, a claim of someone else's freedom to infringe. Take,
for example, the right to vote. That right is so fundamental to an
individual's ability to participate equally and fully in our society
that no one would assert a private right to prevent others from
voting on the basis of their race (or even their sexual
orientation) .
52. See 110 CONG. REc. 4755 (1969) (statement of Sen.Javits arguing that
Congress should give a "just and fair answer" to civil rights demonstrators, that
"they have the right to go into a store or a hotel or a motel with full protection
of the law" because "[t]hat is what the Constitution says [and] [tlhat is what we
must satisfy"); id. at 4757 (statement of Sen. Humphrey that Civil Rights Act was
needed to redress "the suffering and the indignity of second-class citizenship; a
citizenship gap in this country that is indefensible"); id. at 4826 (statement of
Sen. Hart, responding to the suggestion by Sen. Stennis that "everyone was
happy" when each race ate at separate counters at a restaurant by asking, "If the
Federal Government sent a draft notice to a young Negro man in Michigan...
put him in uniform, and sent him to a town in Mississippi; if in that town he
could not get a cup of coffee unless he went to the back door of the restaurant,
does the Senator from Mississippi think that man could be happy?"); id. at
13079-80 (statement of Sen. Clark that Title VII would assure "that no
American, individual, labor union, or corporation, has the right to deny any
other American the very basic civil right of equal job opportunity," which "to a
man or woman whose education has . . . been completed .... is the most
important civil right of all").
53. See NAVA & DAwmoFF, supra note 2, at 70 ("Typically, anti-
discrimination laws do no more than prevent gays and lesbians from being fired
from their jobs and denied housing or medical care because they are gay.
These can be deemed 'special rights' only if a job, food to eat, a place to live,
and medical attention are unusual demands.").
54. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
55. See supra text accompanying note 36 (discussing absence of zero-sum
view of rights in rhetoric of opponents of voting rights provision of Civil Rights
Act of 1964).
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This was not always so, of course. At one time, there was a
vigorous defense of the "white primary," in which ostensibly "pri-
vate" Democratic parties in the South barred African-Americans
from voting to select the party's nominee, who was then assured
of winning the election, effectively disenfranchising even those
few African-Americans who were able to register to vote. But the
Supreme Court, in a move that can readily be seen as reflecting
the magnitude of the right to vote and an unwillingness to recog-
nize the legitimacy of competing claim of whites' freedom not to
associate with blacks,56 reasoned that such "private" organiza-
tions were in fact performing a government function, and hence
found the necessary state action to declare segregated primaries
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.57
Congress in 1964 made the same decision with regard to the
rights to a job, a home, and a hotel room or restaurant: these
equality rights are so crucial that we will accord no legitimacy to
the competing claim to freedom., To put the point another way,
the Civil Rights Act reflects a social policy at once defining what
full citizenship means in our polity, and providing, as a matter of
right, all citizens the full measure of that citizenship status.5"
In a 1964 televised debate between Hubert Humphrey and
Strom Thurmond, Senator Humphrey defended the public
accommodations title with explicit reference to the citizenship
status of those it was intended to protect:
56. The Court has manifested this special concern over abridgements of
the right to vote and to fully participate in the political process in the context of
referenda which seek to limit or bar future enactment of certain types of laws.
Because such limitations infringe the right to petition government of those who
would advocate enactment of the barred laws, the Supreme Court has declared
them unconstitutional. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969)
(holding unconstitutional a charter amendment requiring voter approval of
any future city ordinance dealing with certain forms of housing
discrimination). For the same reason, Colorado's Amendment 2 was struck
down on the ground that it impaired the fundamental right to participate in
the political process. See supra note 22 (discussing decision in Evans v. Romer,
63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 753 (Colo. Dist. CL Dec. 14, 1993)).
57. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-64 (1944); Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953).
58. See Norman C. Amaker, Quittin' Time?: The Antidiscimination Principle
of Title VII vs. The Free Market, 60 U. CHt. L. REv. 757, 779-80 (1993) (arguing
that "[o]ne purpose of Title VII was to help make citizenship for blacks a
reality"). According to Professor Amaker, this conception of the
antidiscrimination principle as reflecting a certain view of what it means to be a
citizen was first suggested to him by Professor Charles Black; see id at 779, once
again demonstrating Professor Black's rare insight into the heart of what "equal
protection" really means.
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I've often wondered, Senator, why it is that we're so anx-
ious to keep good American citizens, who pay their taxes,
who defend their country, who can be good neighbors, out
of a place like a restaurant, and yet we will permit people
who may be very unsavory characters - people that have a
little or no good reputation - people who come from a
foreign country .- to come into the same place?59
The freedom fully to participate in public life, then, is not a
matter of "special rights" at all, but one which is fundamental to
what it means to be a citizen, and which impacts directly upon
the exercise of constitutional rights. That, at least, is the lesson
of the nation-altering decision we made some 30 years ago, and it
is a lesson which opponents of gay rights have not yet learned.
In general, reviewing the central principle that was articu-
lated in support of the Civil Rights Act - that enjoyment of
these rights was a fundamental aspect of full citizenship - shows
how strong is the application of this principle to the fight for
lesbian and gay civil rights. For example, as Senator Humphrey
put it:
[W]e hope we can establish by law the protection of
certain rights that are supposed to be guaranteed by the
Constitution.... I do. not think we can ignore the fact that
today many millions of people in this land of freedom and
liberty are no longer to be told, "That is your place, and
you have no choice in the matter." At least, not in a coun-
try that we say is united. it cannot be. All this bill intends
to do is to give all Americans a choice of what their place
will be. 6°
Senator Humphrey's description of what African-Americans were
seeking in the Civil Rights Act also captures this idea, and is
equally applicable to the demands of lesbians and gay men:
The American Negro does not seek to be set apart
from the community of American life. He seeks to partici-
pate in it. He does not seek separation. Instead, he seeks
participation and inclusion. These Americans want to be
full citizens, to enjoy all the rights and privileges, and to
assume the duties and burdens. Surely Congress can do
nothing less than to permit them to do their job, to be
59. 110 CONG. REC. 6429 (Mar. 26, 1964) (reprinting transcript of the
debate). See also supra note 52.
60. 110 CONG. REC. at 5816-17 (Mar. 20, 1964)(statement of Sen.
Humphrey).
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parts of the total community, and to be parts of the life of
this Nation.6 '
Not to extend these protections to lesbians and gay men is, then,
to confine homosexuals to status as less-than-equal citizens.6 2
Indeed, the stakes involved in permitting discrimination
against homosexuals are even higher because of the impact anti-
gay discrimination has on the ability of lesbians and gay men to
exercise yet other rights guaranteed to all Americans. This is
because, as Richard Mohr has argued, gay men and lesbians are
an "invisible minority," "whose members can be identified only
through an act of will on someone's part."63 A gay man denied
full participation in civic life - if he may lose his job, for exam-
ple, if his homosexuality is known - is coerced into keeping
silent. Such coerced silence has obvious, and significant, implica-
tions for the exercise of constitutional rights. It deprives him of
the rights due any citizen from his government, such as the right
to secure the protections of the criminal justice system if he is the
victim of anti-gay violence." Similarly, a lesbian afraid of losing
her job, home, or children may forego the exercise of a large
measure of her First Amendment rights on issues relating to sex-
ual orientation, because speaking out, lobbying her legislature,
or associating with a gay rights group would expose her to some
or all of those risks.6 5
This point provides a complete answer to the argument of
some opponents of gay and lesbian civil rights that there is no
need for such measures because "homosexuals may pass through
life and selectively shield themselves from criticism, praise, nega-
tive attitudes or other perceptions, in any given situation, simply
because people are unaware of... their sexual preferences one
way or another."6 6 This argument ignores the profound effect of
61. 110 CONG. REC. 6532 (Mar. 30, 1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
62. NAVA & DAWIDOFF, supra note 2, at 135-39 (discussing the "real gay
agenda," under Which lesbians and gays want "our rights as citizens," which
include doing "the things that need to be done to protect gay Americans and
integrate them into the society").
63. MOHR, supra note 44, at 84.
64. RIcHARD D. MOHR, A MORE PERFECr UNION 85-86 (1994) (positing
hypothetical in which two gay men are the victims of a gay-bashing, but neither
can come forward because one would lose his job as a teacher, and the other
would stand to lose visitation rights with his children, as well as his apartment).
65. Id at 87-89 (absent civil rights protections, a lesbian with strong
incentives not to have her lesbianism widely known "is effectively denied all
political power - except the right to vote," and "she will be denied the
freedom to express her views in a public forum and to unite with or organize
other like-minded individuals in an attempt to compete for votes").
66. Rogers, supra note 28, at A21.
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private discrimination on the ability of members of a "hidden
minority" to exercise their constitutional rights. To speak of the
"choice" some lesbians and gay men have to hide their status so
as to avoid discrimination is to ignore the immense personal toll
exacted by confinement in the closet.6 7 The fact that some gays
have the "option" to stay there should be of little consequence in
the debate over civil rights protections.
While the idea of full citizenship is of even greater weight in
the gay rights debate than it was in 1964, not every argument
marshalled by the proponents of the 1964 Act can be used as
effectively by the gay and lesbian rights movement. Most criti-
cally, sponsors of the 1964 Act pointed to overwhelming evidence
of the vast economic impact of employment discrimination on
African-Americans, in terms of poverty, unemployment, lower
wages, and fewer prospects for advancement.' There is much
less evidence of such devastating economic consequences of dis-
crimination against lesbians and gay men.69 This does not mean,
67. See Paul Gibson, Gay and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES YOUTH SUICIDE REPORT 110 (1989), reprinted in
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAw 163 (William B. Rubenstein, ed. 1993)
(noting that gay and lesbian teens "are 2 to 3 times more likely to attempt
suicide than other young people," in part because "[i]f closed about who they
are, they... fac[e] a tremendous internal struggle to understand and accept
themselves"); MOHR, supra note 44, at 160 (quoting interview with gay man
about being in the closet: "The web of deceit I had so consciously and
meticulously woven over the years made it possible for me to rationalize
whatever I had to do to protect myself. You can rationalize the lies, the
deception or whatever. There is no end of it."); Schacter, supra note 35, at 299
("[T] he suggestion that gay men and lesbians can opt out of discrimination by
staying hidden from public view fails to recognize the tryanny of the closet and
the way the closet itself can be an instrument of stigma and social exclusion.
Far from the innocuous safe haven pictured by opponents of gay rights, the
closet exacts a high price in self-esteem, emotional health, and access to the
community.") (footnote omitted).
68. 110 CONG. REC. 6547 (1964) (statement of Senator Humphrey,
discussing relative rates of black and white unemployment, concentration of
blacks in low-paying jobs, and inability of blacks to obtain jobs on which they
utilize their training and skills).
69. See Rogers, supra note 28 (reporting studies showing gay affluence);
Duncan, supra note 16, at 407-08 (arguing that proponents of gay rights
legislation "have (not only] failed to prove that homosexuals have been
impoverished by discrimination, but the data support the opposite conclusion
- homosexuals are an economically advantaged group in our society"). The
results to which Rogers and Duncan point, however, should be taken with more
than a little skepticism. The studies were not random samples. The lesbians
and gay men most apt to respond to such surveys are those who are in a
position of relative comfort and security, and not those in a position of relative
economic insecurity, for whom the loss of their job or home if their sexual
orientation became known would be most catastrophic. If relatively poor gay
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however, that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
rare.70 Rather, it simply reflects the avoidance strategies used by
gay men and lesbians to lessen some of the economic effects of
discrimination, such as self-selecting into professions in which
they believe discrimination is unlikely, or staying in the closet.71
In other words, the career choices of gay men and lesbians are
severely constrained by the threat of discrimination, which forces
gays to stay in the closet and/or vastly limits their career
options.72 This, in turn, reinforces anti-gay stereotypes about
certain professions and about gays in general.73 And this is not
an irrational fear; discrimination against gays is, in fact, wide-
men and lesbians are less willing to state their sexual orientation in response to
surveys, or simply do not participate in them, the results will overstate the
affluence of the overall gay community. See Gay Workers Earn Less in Same Job,
University of Maryland Study Finds, DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA), No. 156, at A9
(Aug. 16, 1994) (quoting Dr. Lee Badgett, author of study on gay and lesbian
earnings, that studies showing "gay prosperity [are] based on marketing surveys
of gay magazine readers and people attending gay events," and that these
surveys "are biased toward people with higher incomes"). Dr. Badgett's study,
which is forthcoming in the Industrial and Labor Relations Review, id., shows
that, when other factors are controlled for, gay men and lesbians are less
affluent than comparable straight men and women. See Employment Non-
Discrimination Act, 1994: Hearings on S.2238 Before the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 (July 29, 1994) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Mary Frances Berry, Chairperson of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, citing study by Dr. Badgett which controlled for
race, sex, education, experience, geographic location and occupation, and
found that "gay and bisexual men earned 11 percent to 27 percent less than
otherwise similarly situated heterosexual men" and "[i]esbian and bisexual
women . . . earned from 5 percent to 14 percent less than heterosexual
women"). Nevertheless, these differences are less severe than the pre-1964
economic harm done to African-Americans by the racial caste system marked by
state-sponsored segregation and private discrimination.
70. See MOHR, supra note 44, at 146-47 & n.17 (discussing evidence of "the
breadth of discrimination against [gays and lesbians] and.., its evil effects").
See also Hearings, supra note 69, at 4 (discussing studies showing that gay
physicians and lawyers have frequently suffered discrimination, and reporting
review of 21 surveys showing that between 16 and 46% of respondents
"reported having experienced some form of discrimination in employment -
in hiring, promotion, firing, or harassment").
71. MOHR, supra note 44, at 146-47 & n.17 (because of rampant
discrimination in academia, "[i]t comes as no surprise ... that virtually all gays
and lesbians in academe ... are deeply in the closet").
72. MOHR, supra note 64, at 81-82 (the career choices of gays made in
"response to prospective discrimination" have caused "many small businesses or
dead-end occupations [to] ... become so closely associated with homosexuality
.. "). I would, however, resist Mohr's characterization of certain jobs as "dead-
end" occupations.
73. Id. at 82 (noting that the stereotype of certain professions as "gay" is
so strong that "nongays who might otherwise go into these lines of employment
do not do so out of fear that they will be socially branded as gay").
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spread,"4 including significant workplace harassment of the sort
that has been the subject of recent high-profile allegations of sex
discrimination.75
Nevertheless, the economic impact of anti-gay discrimina-
tion has been, as opponents of ENDA have already begun to
argue,76 substantially less catastrophic than the impact of Ameri-
can apartheid on African-Americans. It is thus important to
frame the debate by remembering that the rights provided by the
Civil Rights Act are not "special rights" but instead are elements
of full and complete citizenship. To deny them to gay men and
lesbians on the basis of sexual orientation requires more of ajus-
tification than the anti-gay forces have provided with their "spe-
cial rights" rhetoric.
C. The Moral Status of Homosexuality and of
Anti-Gay Discrimination
Once the fundamental nature of the rights at stake is
established, the next step in overcoming the "special rights" ca-
nard is to establish that there is no more legitimacy to anti-gay
discrimination than there is to racial, gender, or religious
discrimination."' This is not to say that they are the same, but
74. MOHR, supra note 44, at 155 & n.29 (quoting from NIMH study
showing that 1 in 6 "gay people in this country have employment problems and
over 9 percent lose their jobs solely because of their sexual orientation"). If
anything, the incidence of discrimination against gays and lesbians is
underreported, for many of the reasons I have already discussed, see supra text
accompanying notes 63-67, regarding the coerced silence of closeted gays. See
Hearings, supra note 69, at 4 ("Available statistics underrepresent the actual
incidence of discrimination based on sexual orientation. . . . The fear of
discovery or retaliation if they file a complaint has been cited in many accounts
as the reason that [gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals] are reluctant to report
discriminatory acts, even in jurisdictions that prohibit such acts.").
75. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation:
A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. LJ. 1, 1-2 (1992)
(describing the vicious sexual harassment visited upon two men because they
were, or were perceived to be, gay).
76. See DAILY LABOR REPORT, supra note 7, at A15 (testimony of Joseph
Broadus that gays are "highly educated" and "highly paid").
77. This also helps to answer the real difficulty with "comparing"
oppression which permits opponents of gay and lesbian rights to accuse the
movement of usurping the rhetoric and moral arguments of the black civil
rights movement. See supra note 28. The point is not which kind of
discrimination is worse, or which people are most victimized. Lesbians and gays
need not show that their claim to civil rights is as strong as that of African-
Americans, or women, or any other protected group, but only that it is stronger
than the claim of those who assert the right to discriminate. The model which
pits the claims of discrimination victims against one another presupposes that
proponents of anti-discrimination protections must show that there is a
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that anti-gay bias is no more legitimate or worthy of deference
from society.7
8
legitimate basis for ending anti-gay discrimination, thus naturally spurring
comparisons to other instances where such a basis has been found to exist, such
as racial discrimination. But this model is flawed; what must be shown is that
there is no legitimate basis for the discrimination.
Even if the comparison between the equality interests of gays and African-
Americans is a valid one, and even assuming that homosexuals' claimed right to
non-discriminatory treatment is not as strong as that of African-Americans
(because, for example, anti-gay discrimination is less pervasive today than was
racial discrimination in 1964), that also must count on the other side of the
equation: if the smaller incidence of anti-gay discrimination attenuates the
equality interest, then there is also a lesser liberty interest to be asserted on the
part of would-be discriminators. This entire argument, of course, assumes that
a wholesale perspective is appropriate. Looked at from an individualist
perspective, the liberty interest of the single individual who claims the right to
discriminate against gays and lesbians is no weaker than that of the single
individual who would like to discriminate on the basis of race. But adopting
that individualist perspective on the liberty side requires us to do the same -
assess the individual's right to equal treatment - on the equality side,
rendering the frequency of anti-gay discrimination compared to other forms of
discrimination irrelevant. We must, in short, weigh the individual gay man or
lesbian's claim to equal treatment against the liberty right of the discriminator,
not against another, unrelated claim to equal treatment.
Professor Jane Schacter has recently advanced a sophisticated and
persuasive argument against the claim that gay rights advocates must show that
anti-gay discrimination is "equivalent" to another form of discrimination that is
already illegal. See Schacter, supra note 35, at 296-300 (arguing that it is
inconsequential that '[d]iscrimination against gay men and lesbians as a group
has not mirrored the discrimination suffered by other groups protected under
civil rights laws," because '[t]he experience of these protected groups have
themselves ... been far from identical").
78. Professor Duncan argues that laws barring discrimination against
homosexuals (and their resulting infringement on the liberty to discriminate)
are less justified than laws barring racial discrimination because "[w]hen an
employer or landlord makes a distinction based on a person's sexuality, he is
making ajudgment about the content of that individual's character." Duncan,
supra note 16, at 405. The difficulty with this reasoning is that, prior to the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the same argument could have been
(and was) advanced in favor of the right to discriminate on the basis of race:
employers who refused to hire African-Americans did so not merely on a whim,
but because they were acting on judgments about the character of African-
Americans - that they could not be trusted, were not responsible, were' lazy
workers, etc. We rejected permitting the use of such gross and stereotyped
generalizations, even though those who held these opinions believed they were
accurate and could form the basis for judgment. In other words, when racial
discrimination was outlawed, race was, like sexual orientation today, "morally
controversial" in the sense that many felt it was a legitimate basis for deciding
how to treat people. Moreover, it was certainly a "sincerely held religious or
moral belief," id., of opponents of the Civil Rights Act that, even if blacks were
no less moral than whites, that mixing of the races was "unnatural" and that, for
this, reason, discrimination and segregation were morally good. See supra note
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Answering the question of whether it is permissible to dis-
criminate on the basis of sexual orientation requires an examina-
tion of -what makes use of a particular criterion permissible.
Many criteria used in an employment decision (say, a hiring deci-
sion) are not barred. Some of these we do not prohibit for the
obvious reason that they are directly related to the position: an
applicant may be rejected based on her lack of qualifications.
Others, though unrelated to the job (e.g., red hair), are still not
placed off-limits to the decision-maker, essentially because, even
if we believe she is acting irrationally, we value her autonomy and
wish to minimize interference with it.
The first category, relevant criteria, may be taken out of the
discussion by assuming that sexual orientation is virtually always
irrelevant to the position in question.79 This leaves the issue of
whether sexual orientation is more like those irrelevant criteria
whose use is not permitted, such as race and gender, or those
whose use is permitted, such as the alphabetical order of the last
names of all job applicants.
Anti-gay forces, however, say that sexual orientation as a fac-
tor in employment decisions is acceptable, even admirable,
because homosexuality is not like either set of irrelevancies, the
permissible or the impermissible, because it is bad, immoral, or
sinful, ° and hence should be discouraged."1 Sponsors of the
35 (describing Senator Long's appeal to natural law in arguments against the
Civil Rights Act). Finally, Professor Duncan's reliance on Dr. King's teaching
that people should be judged by the "content of their character," Duncan, supra
note 16, at 402, also ignores the point that while the right to make and hold
private judgments about another person's character is absolute, the right to act
on those judgments in the public sphere can be circumscribed. See infra text
accompanying notes 93-97 (describing distinction between absolute right to
believe and the limited right to act on one's beliefs). That is why employment
decisions based on generalized or stereotyped judgments about members of
certain races or religions - even judgments about character - are not
permitted under Title VII. Professor Duncan cannot therefore simply rest on
the assertion that judgments about homosexuality are, perforce, judgments
about the character of gay men and lesbians. See also infra note 110 (arguing
that immutability of sexual orientation makes judgments about the "character"
of homosexuals irrational).
79. This assumption would be made explicit legislative policy by Section 2
of ENDA, which finds that "an individual's sexual orientation bears no
relationship to the individual's ability to contribute fully to the economic and
civic life of society." See DAILY LABOR REPORT, supra note 11, at D1.
80. See Duncan, supra note 16, at 415 (arguing against gay-rights
legislation because "we all do not demand that our sins be recognized as civil
rights"); see supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
81. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing argument
that anti-gay bias is justified to encourage young people of "wavering" sexuality
to select heterosexuality).
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Civil Rights Act did not face the argument that blacks were inher-
ently bad and therefore did not merit protections that would
otherwise be justified, and for obvious reasons opponents did not
assert that deterring others from becoming black was a reason to
permit (or even encourage) discrimination against blacks.
The directly anti-gay argument - unlike the "special rights"
rhetoric that seeks to camouflage anti-gay animus in the guise of
a neutral objection to unwarranted rights for anyone - is at least
honest, in the sense that it offers policy-makers and voters a clear
picture of the real basis for opposition to protecting lesbians and
gay men from discrimination. While some of the premises for
these arguments are deceptive and misleading, such as the
notion that the Bible unequivocally condemns homosexuality as
a mortal sin, 2 the argument itself honestly expresses the motives
of its proponents, and it puts the focus squarely onto morality-
based arguments.
1. The Significance of Religion in the Moral Debate
Part of the issue in responding to these anti-gay positions is
what to do about the fact that much the basis for them consists of
fundamentalist religious beliefs that condemn homosexuality.,
Some supporters of lesbian and gay rights have criticized reliance
by anti-gay forces on these religious principles, saying that
[o] ne of the guiding principles of society, enshrined in the
Constitution as a check against the government, is that
decisions affecting social policy are not made on religious
grounds .... If the real ground of the alleged immorality
[of homosexuality) invoked by governments to discriminate
against gays is religious... then one of the major commit-
ments of our nation is violated.8 4
While the specific message of anti-gay forces is undemocratic and
dangerous because it is intolerant and does not respect the core
values of individual autonomy and privacy, it should be opposed
on these grounds and not because its basis is religious.
82. See NAVA & DAVIDOFF, supra note 2, at 105-11 (discussing considerable
theological dispute about Biblical teaching). See also infra note 88 (noting
differing religious attitudes towards homosexuality).
83. See supra note 2; see also Heaings, supra note 69, at 1 (testimony of
Robert H. Knight opposing ENDA in part because the "great religions of the
world condemn homosexual behavior in their scriptures").
84. MOHR, supra note 64, at 9-10. See also NAVA & DAVIDOFF, supra note 2,
at 76 (arguing that the "disestablishment clause" of the First Amendment
"protects the state from the warring religious interests that have bloodied
history" by "fostering religious freedom for all without ascendancy for any").
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In other words, the more general belief that religious princi-
ples do not have a significant place in public debate is mis-
guided. For one thing, as Nava and Dawidoff recognize, it would
be impossible to keep them out even if, in an ideal world, they
should be kept out, because "[m]ost Americans believe in a God
... and the majority subscribe to particular religious traditions or
denominations.""5 Nor should religion be kept out of the market-
place of ideas; a major and effective element of the 1960s civil
rights movement was that it emerged from black churches and
was led, in part, by ministers.8 6 We cannot welcome the infusion
of religion into the body politic only when we happen to approve
of its message. In addition, those whose views on political issues
are theologically-based have free speech rights, and they cannot
be barred from basing their speech on religious principles.
Most important, advocates of gay and lesbian rights should
not shrink from making the case that basic religious tenets,
including tolerance, community, and family, support the cause of
barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 1
Fighting to keep religion out of the debate - a battle which is
futile in any event - makes it appear that the case for gay rights
is contrary to religious values, when in fact it, like other cam-.
paigns against other forms of bigotry, is deeply consistent with
them. s
Nava and Da-widoff are correct, however, that religiously-
based arguments are entitled to no greater respect or deference
85. Id. at 79.
86. See ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, To REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 13
(1987) (during bus boycotts throughout the South in mid-1950s, "[p]reachers
were indeed moving into the vanguard of black protest in the South," and
afterward the SCLC "became a dynamic force within the civil rights movement
and one of the most effective political pressure groups in American history").
87. See Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion
and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. Rxv. 521, 534 (1989) (urging that a homosexual
right to privacy should be defended on the same ground that marital privacy
was found to exist in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965),
because "like marriage, homosexual union may also be 'intimate to the degree
of being sacred... a harmony in living.., a bilateral loyalty,' an association for
a 'noble . . . purpose' ").
88. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988
Wis. L. REv. 187, 214-18 (arguing that "the dominant attitude of mainstream
Protestant and Jewish thought is one of pluralistic tolerance toward
homosexuality;" that "[slome religious groups and thinkers have gone beyond a
civil rights position that urges state tolerance [and] additionally affirm the
humanity of homosexuals and emphasize the need to create a religious
community that welcomes them;" and that "some religious teaching goes
beyond both tolerance and community to celebrate the affirmative good that is
possible in homosexual, as well as heterosexual, relationships").
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in political debates simply because they are religious.8 9 For this
reason, any claims that criticism of anti-gay arguments amounts
to "religion bashing" should be dismissed; a bigot is not immune
from the charge of bigotry merely because she asserts a religious
basis for her position.9 ° The reply to the anti-gay forces that "we
reject your argument because it is religious" lends credibility to
the religion bashing charge. The alternative reply, "We reject
your argument, regardless of its religious basis, because it is big-
oted, intolerant, and wrong, and here is why," cannot fairly be
called religion bashing, because it responds to the substance of
the anti-gay argument.
Responding to the religious basis for opposition to gay-rights
laws also requires an answer to the argument that those religious
beliefs confer a right to engage in the discrimination -- and that
89. Id. at 88 ("Religious-based values are not banned from the public
arena, but they are not vested with any greater moral force than competing
viewpoints, nor are they exempt from rational examination simply because they
originate in someone's notion of the divine. The religious origin of opinion
does not, in our system, give the opinion any special status in public debate.").
90. Professor Duncan tells the interesting story of his experience
attending a screening, at a panel discussion, of the film STOP THE CHURCH
(Altar Ego Productions 1990), which deals with the "illegal disruption of Mass
at St. Patrick's Cathedral by a group of homosexual and abortion activists."
Duncan, supra note 16, at 440-41. Duncan describes the movie - which is
decidedly sympathetic to the protestors and hostile to the Catholic Church -
as filled with "hatred and blasphemy,"' id: at 441, and he recounts being
.ashamed of my University that evening for sponsoring this 'documentary,' but
[being] even more ashamed for those in the audience who so thoroughly
enjoyed this angry, hateful, Christophobic film." Id. What Professor Duncan
draws from this experience is not entirely clear. If he means to criticize the
tactic of disrupting a church service, I entirely agree with him. If he means to
go further, and criticize the film (and, by implication, the audience) for
defending such conduct, he may also have a point. I believe, however, that
Professor Duncan intends something more than a statement about one specific
tactic. He seems to believe that there is something disturbing about harsh, even
virulent, disagreements with the Catholic Church and its positions on
homosexuality, and that such disagreements are a threat to the ideal of
religious freedom. Id. at 442. If that is what he means, I disagree. Having
involved itself in controversial issues of public policy, the Catholic Church's
position is not entitled to deference or respect merely because it comes from a
religious institution. In other words, I do not share Professor Duncan's
"shame" at the underlying anti-Catholic attitudes expressed by the protestors.
For me, these criticisms are simply the opposition that comes naturally when
anyone - even the Catholic Church - exercises free speech, rights. The
positions a church takes should not be criticized merely because it is a church
that is speaking, but neither would I refrain from criticizing those positions just
as vigorously as I would criticize the same positions coming from Pat Buchanan
or Richard Duncan. If the Catholic Church expects a "free pass" from criticism
for its positions because it is a church, it is expecting far more deference than
the Free Exercise Clause provides.
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this religious freedom should not (or even may not) be
infringed.91 This argument, however, is merely the zero-sum
argument all over again, this time recast from a generalized lib-
erty-based right to discriminate to a specific religious liberty-based
right to discriminate. As I have shown, however, a purported lib-
erty to discriminate (whether based on assertions of economic
freedom, or the right to free association, or the right to discrimi-
nate in accordance with moral and religious principles), has
always been asserted in opposition to proposals to recognize an
equality-based right to be free of discrimination.92 To the extent
that these assertions, if recognized, would infringe upon funda-
mental aspects of other individuals' citizenship, we have correctly
rejected them.
Moreover, freedom to act on religious beliefs is not, as Pro-
fessor Duncan apparently believes, absolute. His argument that
gay rights legislation is unconstitutional as applied to discrimina-
tion practiced pursuant to anti-gay religious beliefs,9" cannot be
taken seriously. Once religious beliefs are removed from the sac-
rosanct realm of the conscience and brought outinto the world
of commerce and business, they are subject to regulationjust like
other business practices. 4 Congress may choose to provide a reli-
gious exemption - as it did for religious employers in Title
VII,95 and as is contained in ENDA96 - but it is not constitution-
ally required to do so.97
91. See Duncan, supra note 16, at 414 ("Persons who believe the
homosexual lifestyle is sinful, immoral or destructive of traditional family values
are given a Hobson's choice under homosexual rights laws - either reject
these deep personal beliefs as a code of business ethics, or get out of
business.").
92. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23 and 30-35 (describing zero-
sum argument and its use in opposition to Civil Rights Act of 1964).
93. Duncan, supra note 16, at 438-39.
94. Cf. EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 619 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989) (rejecting assertion by
manufacturer of mining equipment that it is a "religious employer" permitted
to discriminate on the basis of religion by Title VII). The Ninth Circuit rejected
the free exercise claim of Townley's owners, who professed their belief that "the
Bible and their covenant with God require them to share the Gospel with all of
their employees." Id. at 620 (holding that the impact on the Townleys' beliefs
of requiring exemption for employees who object to mandatory religious
services would not "be unreasonable and extreme").
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a) (1988) (exemption for religious
discrimination by religious employers); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2) (1988)
(exemption for religious schools).
96. See DAILY LABOR REPORT, supra note 11, at D1 (Section 7 provides that
"this Act shall not apply to religious organizations").
97. Professor Duncan argues that a gay rights statute would not be a law
of "neutral and general application" within the meaning of Employment
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2. The Morality Of Homosexuality: John Finnis and the
Jurisprudence of Insult
There is, of course, a traditional argument - based primar-
ily but not exclusively on Catholic views of sexual morality - that
homosexuality is wrong and hence can be the basis of societal
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that "the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)"), if it has
religious exceptions that limit its coverage. Duncan, supra note 16, at 424-25
(arguing that an "across-the-board prohibition of all employment and housing
discrimination ... should pass the test of formal neutrality," but that where
there is a religious exemption, it must be "all or nothing" to be "neutral" and
save the statute from the need to show a compelling justification).
Similarly, Professor Duncan argues that the law is not "generally
applicable" if it has "unequal exemptions," even if they are entirely unrelated to
religion. Id. at 429. Under this analysis, Tide VII would not be a law of "neutral
and general application" because it has only a limited religious exemption, see
supra note 95 and accompanying text, and various unrelated exemptions, but
this is obviously wrong. The flaw in Duncan's analysis is that he uses the
presence of exceptions to justify subjecting the underlying law to heightened
scrutiny, when all that exceptions require is a justification for the exception.
For example, Professor Duncan makes the genuinely silly argument that
because California's law barring anti-gay housing discrimination contains an
exception for dwellings "containing not more than four units," id. at 428, and
that religious renters with more than four units cannot take advantage, the law
is not "generally applicable" since "religious exercise is restricted while some
other interests are not." Id. at 429. But the exception is generally applicable
where religion is concerned: it exempts all buildings with four or fewer units,
regardless of the religious or secular basis upon which the owner would like to
discriminate. Professor Duncan is comparing apples and oranges. As to
religious exemptions like the one contained in Tide VII, Duncan is correct that
these distinguish between institutions based on whether they meet a certain
definition qualifying them as "religious." However, this is a definitional
necessity; any exemption for religion, even that represented by the Free
Exercise Clause itself, requires some basis for distinguishing between religious
and non-religious entities. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 675
(1970) (exempting religious organizations "occasions some degree of
involvement with religion"). Of course, the entire question of the meaning of
Smith is somewhat moot, since, as Professor Duncan notes, its analysis has been
superseded by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (Supp. V 1993). Duncan, supra note 16, at 439-40. He is wrong,
however, that the RFRA would bar application of a gay rights law like ENDA to
anyone who happens to have a religious reason for wanting to discriminate.
The RFRA restores the pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause analysis, and that
standard had never been held to constitutionally require an exemption to anti-
discrimination statutes for people with a religious desire to discriminate. If any
exemption were constitutionally required, ENDA's exemption for religious
institutions, supra note 96, would suffice.
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opprobrium and, at least in certain circumstances, sanction.9"
John Finnis argues that only heterosexual conduct within a mari-
tal relationship can be moral, because of the "insuperable double
goods of [heterosexual] marriage - as a union not of mere
instinct but of reasonable love, and not merely for procreation
but for mutual help, goodwill and cooperation for their own
sake."' In his view, only intercourse "between spouses enables
them to actualize and experience . . . their marriage itself, as
a single reality with two blessings (children and mutual
affection) ."0o
Professor Finnis' implicit assumption that the qualities of
"reasonable love," "mutual help," "goodwill" and "cooperation"
are necessarily absent from homosexual relationships is based on
stereotyped misconceptions,' 0 ' while his, assumption that these
qualities are present in heterosexual marriages is based on the
arguments of Plato, Plutarch, Aquinas, and the Catholic Church
in general, °2 which defend an idealized conception of hetero-
sexual marriage that very often does not describe its reality.
Neither he, nor his sources, offers any evidence that homosexual
and heterosexual relationships actually differ in these ways.
98. I take as my text for this claim a recent article by Professor John
Finnis. John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation", 69 NOTRE DAME
L. Rv. 1049 (1994); see also Duncan, supra note 16, at 403-04 & n.40 (arguing
that "[sexual conduct and preferences are fraught with moral and religious
significance"). While Finnis does not specifically link his argument to the claim
that laws barring anti-gay discrimination constitute "special rights," the implicit
link is there, as demonstrated by Finnis' approval of "laws, regulations and
policies [that] discriminate (i.e. distinguish) between heterosexual and
homosexual conduct adversely to the. latter." Finnis, supra, at 1049. Professor
Finnis attempts to provide a moral justification for state action that not only
permits private discrimination, but which itself discriminates. To the extent
that the anti-gay forces employing the "special rights" rhetoric embrace the
moral justification for viewing gay rights claims as "special rights" claims, it is
important to answer such attempts at moral suasion.
99. Id. at 1063.
100. Id. at 1064. See also Duncan, supra note 16, at 404 & n.40 (describing
the "natural law tradition" which "condemns homosexual practices such as anal
intercourse as an unnatural perversion of reproductive and digestive organs").
101. If Professor Finnis truly doubts that gay and lesbian relationships are
possessed of these qualities, my best suggestion for him (and others who may
share his ignorance) is to read one of two works by Paul Monette about his
relationship with his longtime partner, Roger Horwitz. The first is Monette's
account of caring for Horwitz as he slowly died of AIDS. PAUL MONETrE,
BORuOWED TIME: AN AIDS MEMOIR (1988). The second is a series of elegies
Monette wrote in his grief after Horwitz died. PAUL MONETrE, LOVE ALONE:
EIGHTEEN ELEGIFS FOR ROG (1988). Both display, in abundance, the deep love
and devotion that Finnis cannot conceive existing between partners of the same
sex.
102. Finnis, supra note 98, at 1064-65.
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Perhaps that is why the real linchpin of Finnis' argument
appears to be that only heterosexual intercourse can result in
procreation, so that homosexuals' "sexual acts together cannot
do what they may hope and imagine [ ], ... [bi ecause their activa-
tion of one or even each of their reproductive organs cannot be
an actualizing and experiencing of the marital good ... ...0S It is
true that only heterosexual couples can produce children
entirely without the involvement of any third party. But it is diffi-
cult, at best, to understand why this difference between homosex-
ual couples and heterosexual couples could ever justify
discrimination in jobs, housing, and public accommodations.10 4
It is particularly difficult to understand the force Finnis supposes
this distinction has for modem purposes, when such third-party
involvement (e.g., artificial insemination; surrogacy) in procrea-
tion is now not only possible, but common, for couples both
homosexual and heterosexual who wish to raise children but
who, for whatever reason, cannot have a child by "normal"
methods. 10 5
Professor Finnis believes that the fact that genital inter-
course, alone among sexual acts, can produce children, together
with the relational elements he supposes are exclusive to hetero-
sexual marriage, make for some sort of equation: heterosexual
conduct (with and because of the possibility of procreation) +
103. Id. at 1066 (emphasis in original).
104: Professor Finnis does not defend the most extreme version of an
anti-gay policy: discriminating against lesbians and gay men merely on the basis
of "a psychological or psychomatic disposition inwardly orienting one towards
homosexual activity." Id. at 1053 (emphasis in original). Instead, he focuses on
homosexual conduct, which he argues the state may prohibit and/or punish
because (to put it tersely) the conduct is immoral. Oddly, Finnis confuses the
matter somewhat by writing of "public activities intended specifically to promote,
procure and facilitate homosexual conducL" Id. at 1054 (emphasis in original).
It is not clear what he means by "public activities," but it is clear that he does
not mean to argue only that the state may regulate homosexual conduct in
public places (a fairly unremarkable proposition), since the remainder of the
article is spend arguing that any homosexual conduct - even that which goes
on in private, between consenting adults who are life partners - is immoral
and may properly be regulated by the state, and that those who engage in such
conduct should not be protected by antidiscrimination laws. See id. at 1055
(arguing that "explicit or implicit judgments... about the evil of homosexual
conduct" can- "be defended by reflective, critical, publicly intelligible and
rational arguments").
105. This is why Professor Finnis' comment that homosexuality "disposes
the participants to an abdication of responsibility for the future of humankind,"
id. at 1069, is, at best, outdated - assuming, of course, that prior generations of
homosexuals who lacked modem means to have children were "abdicating
responsibility for the future of humankind" simply because they did not
themselves reproduce.
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marriage (with and because of aspects of mutual devotion) =
moral behavior.1 "6 Finnis fails on two levels, however. First, he
completely fails to explain why this one aspect of (certain) heter-
osexual conduct - that it has the potential for procreation - is
not merely relevant to, but is determinative of, the morality of
the conduct. He makes the leap from the truism that homosex-
ual sex acts cannot be intended to procreate to the conclusion
that "in reality, whatever the generous hopes and dreams and
thoughts of giving with which some same-sex partners may sur-
round their sexual acts, those acts cannot express or do more
than is expressed or done if two strangers engage in such activity
to give each other pleasure.. ."117 Professor Finnis' assumption
that if a sex act cannot be an expression of procreative potential
it cannot be an expression of anything besides sexual pleasure
ignores the extent to which the sex act can be an expression of
the emotional bonds and commitment two people - regardless
of their gender - can share, bonds which are a "reality" differ-
entiating homosexual partners from "two strangers," even if Fin-
nis cannot comprehend this reality or chooses to ignore it.
Professor Finnis' equation of a long-term, loving gay or les-
bian relationship with sex between two strangers is also pro-
foundly insulting, to an extent that deserves emphasis. He
begins by asserting that the lovemaking of homosexual life part-
ners who share a lifetime of devotion to one another, who may
raise children together, who care for one another in times of cri-
sis and illness - that their sexual life together has more in com-
mon with a sexual liaison between total strangers than with the
sexual union of a married couple. That is insulting enough. But
Finnis goes still further, asserting that the homosexual couple's
106. Id. at 1067 ("[S]exual acts are not unitive in their significance unless
they are marital... and.., they are not marital unless they have not only the
generosity of acts of friendship but also the procreative significance... at least
as being, as human conduct, acts of the reproductive kind.").
107. Id. (emphasis in original). Finnis apparently intends to emphasize
the child that can be produced by genital intercourse as the tangible "reality"
that distinguishes heterosexual and homosexual conduct. The "hopes and
dreams and thoughts" that may be part of homosexual partners' sexual acts are
not a sufficient reality for Finnis. This is ironic, given that Catholic doctrine
teaches that one's intangible belief in Christ as personal savior-rather than a
tangible "reality" such as good acts during life, which have only derivative
significance as an indication of an individual's acceptance of Christ's
teachings-is the exclusive path to salvation. See ALAN SCHRECK, CATHOUC AND
CHRISTIAN: AN EXPLANTION OF COMMONLY MISUNDERSTOOD CATHOLIC BELEFS
17-24 (describing conscious, personal commitment to Jesus Christ as the only
way a person can be saved). One cannot help but wonder why beliefs and
attitudes are dismissed as unreal and of no moral consequence in the one case,
but are considered determinative of the fate of the soul in the other.
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lovemaking not only is quite like sex between strangers, but that
it expresses nothing more at all than is expressed between two total
strangers engaged in the prototypical "one-night stand."' Such
belittling of the dignity of other human beings' lives, offered as
the basis for law and policy-making, is unworthy of genuine con-
sideration, much less deference, notwithstanding its estimable,
Thomist pedigree.
Second, even assuming that there is a connection between
procreative potential and morality which makes marital hetero-
sexual conduct morally good, Professor Finnis fails to explain
why its absence in other sexual conduct, including homosexual
conduct, makes such behavior immoral, rather than simply mor-
ally neutral.
So long as the comparison is fairly made - not comparing
promiscuous homosexuality with monogamous heterosexuality,
or vice-versa - the moral arguments against homosexual con-
duct and relationships are unconvincing. Professor Finnis'
attempt to articulate out of anti-gay Catholic doctrine a moral
basis for legal disadvantaging of gay men and lesbians merely
demonstrates the extent to which that doctrine is, at best, based
on stereotypes about homosexuals and their lives. At worst, it is a
jurisprudence of insult rather than of reason.
3. The Morality of Anti-Gay Discrimination
The special rights claim posits two different, though related,
morality-based arguments against laws barring sexual orientation
discrimination. The first is that homosexuality is immoral, and
that sexual orientation is therefore not a valid basis for anti-dis-
crimination protection. In the immediately preceding section, I
have addressed that claim. The second, related point is that it is
not wrong to discriminate against homosexuals. - primarily
because their conduct is immoral - and that such discrimina-
tion should therefore not be banned. Justifying sexual orienta-
tion as a basis for civil rights protections in the face of the special
rights position thus requires not only an answer to the claim that
homosexuality is immoral, but also an affirmative argument that
it is discrimination against homosexuals that is immoral.
108. To the extent that this position reflects mainstream contemporary
Catholic theology - and it is my understanding that it closely resembles the
position of the Church - it should help to explain to Professor Duncan the
resentment and hostility many lesbians and gay men feel toward the Catholic
Church that was shown in the documentary STOP THE CHURCH. See supra note
90 (discussing Duncan's experience attending a screening of the film).
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Most of the arguments about the immorality of denying gay
men and lesbians their rights based solely on sexual orientation
have been made -- exhaustively, eloquently, and persuasively -
elsewhere, and there is little need to add to those thoughts
already expressed quite well enough.1"
One aspect of this debate merits additional attention, how-
ever, because it has become a matter of great controversy among
advocates of gay and lesbian rights: the argument that discrimi-
nation against lesbians and gay men is immoral because homo-
sexuality is immutable. This seems to be the most compelling
argument that anti-gay discrimination is immoral. It is thus a
crucial element of a persuasive answer to the "special rights"
rhetoric. The force of the immutability claim, and the impor-
tance of advancing it, seem to be self-evident; the moral force of
the principle underlying the immutability argument - that peo-
ple should not be ill-treated based on a characteristic or status
they are unable to change - speaks largely for itself.110
Nevertheless, vigorous and sophisticated arguments have
recently been advanced in favor of abandoning immutability. In
109. See generaly NAVA & DAWTDOFF, supra note 2, at 23-27 (arguing that
the campaign for gay rights is based upon the fundamental notion of
"individual rights"); MOHR, supra note 44, at 140-61 (arguing that regulation of
private discrimination against gay men and lesbians is justified by "the values of
dignity, self-determination, and individual flourishing"). See also supra notes 87-
88 (describing the positions of Michael Sandel and Sylvia Law regarding moral
argumentation in debates over gay and lesbian rights).
110. See MOHR, supra note 44, at 39 ("It is generally conceded that if
sexual orientation is something over which an individual . . . has virtually no
control, then discrimination against gays is deplorable ... because it holds
people accountable without regard for anything they themselves have done.").
The immutability of sexual orientation is a sufficient answer to Professor
Duncan's attempt to distinguish sexual orientation discrimination from racial
discrimination because, he claims, the anti-gay discriminator "is making a
judgment about the content of [the homosexual's] character." Duncan, supra
note 16, at 405. Even to the extent that the anti-black discriminator is not
doing the same thing, see supra note 78 (arguing that racial discrimination also
involves making judgments about character), the problem with this defense is
that if sexual orientation is immutable, it is both irrational and wrong to form
judgments about character on that basis, and such judgments are entitled to no
deference or credit in the debate over sexual orientation laws. Professor
Duncan attempts to disarm the immutability point by arguing that "the
immutability of race is [not] the reason that racial discrimination is anathema in
our society and under our laws." Duncan, supra note 16, at 402. It is certainly
true that the immutability of race is not the only reason our laws bar race
discrimination. Hence, Duncan is correct that if race were suddenly made
mutable by ingestion of a drug, we would not take seriously the argument "that
civil rights laws should not cover blacks who declined the drug and thereby
chose to remain black." Id. However, immutability is one of the reasons why
discrimination is wrong.
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particular, Professor Janet Halley has urged gay rights litigators
not to advance the immutability argument in cases challenging
the constitutionality of governmental discrimination against gays
and lesbians."' l In light of these arguments, it is worth pointing
out the significance of immutability in the moral equation. Pro-
fessor Halley errs badly in focusing entirely on the constitutional
question, missing the force of immutability in the debate over
the legitimacy of private anti-gay discrimination.' 12
Halley suggests that in constitutional terms, immutability is
really a surrogate for irrationality, reflecting the "determination
that statutes attempting to deter people from bearing immutable
characteristics are often irrational." '" She believes we should
therefore simply focus on rationality rather than immutability.
. To begin with, Professor Halley is wrong that immutability is
really just a way to say that the deterrence justification is irra-
tional. It is wrong to treat people badly based on an immutable
characteristic, regardless of whether it is also irrational to' do so
for the purpose of deterrence, or for any other purpose:" 4
111. Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique
of the Argument from Immutability" 46 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1993) [hereinafter
Halley, The Politics of Biology]; Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards
Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915
(1989) [hereinafter Halley, The Politics of the Closet]. Although Professor Halley
writes about the use of immutability in the context of constitutional litigation,
and some- of her arguments against its use are specific to Equal Protection
Clause doctrine, see infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text, most of her
critique is addressed to the substance of the immutability argument. Thus, I
believe it is fair to say that Halley would also reject using-the argument in moral
and political debate about private anti-gay discrimination.
112. It would be a substantial digression to address specifically the use of
immutability in constitutional litigation, even though the purported minimal
utility of immutability in such cases has been a major aspect of Professor
Halley's work. See generally Halley, The Politics of Biology, supra note I 11, at 507-
14; Halley, The Politics of the Closet, supra note 111, at 923-32. Suffice it to say that
I believe it is more important than Halley reckons as a factor in the decision
whether strict scrutiny should be applied, but I agree with her that it is, by itself,
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for strict scrutiny. For now, my
point is that from the perspective of the gay and lesbian civil rights movement
as a whole, immutability has rhetorical, political, and moral force that makes it
virtually indispensable. For this reason, and because it accurately characterizes
the experience of millions of lesbians and gay men (see infra note 119 and
accompanying text), we should make the'argument - and for consistency's
sake, if nothing else, it should also be used in constitutional cases.
113. Halley, The Politics of Biology, supra note 111, at 928 (emphasis in
original).
114. Indeed, one can envision conditions under which it would not be
irrational to discriminate against individuals based on an immutable
characteristic, even for the purpose of deterring it. See infra text accompanying
notes 118-28 (discussing implications of premise that sexual orientation may be
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But even if Halley were correct that, in constitutional terms,
the immutability argument is simply another way of saying that
discriminatory conduct is, irrational, it still leaves us with the
choice of how best to frame the argument. We can say, as Profes-
sor Halley would apparently suggest (if immutability is to be used
at all), that discrimination against gays and lesbians is irrational
because, inter alia, it seeks to deter an immutable characteristic
that is not voluntarily chosen. Alternatively, we can say, as Halley
urges us not to, that sexual orientation is immutable, from which
flows the conclusion (among others) that it is irrational to seek
to deter people from choosing one particular sexual orientation.
These formulations may seem little different at first, but the
difference is of great significance outside the context of constitu-
tional litigation, when the focus turns to private discrimination.
When litigating a constitutional claim, the plaintiff wins if she
shows that a discriminatory governmental action or policy was
irrational. In the private context, however, it is not enough to
show that a decision was made for irrational reasons. 1 5
Since permitting even irrational decisions can be justified
out of respect for a private decision maker's autonomy, some-
thing beyond a showing that anti-gay discrimination is irrational
is needed. The first formulation, suggested by Professor Halley's
approach, begins and ends with irrationality, with immutability
reduced to the status of an underlying reason. As such, it does
not justify laws barring private anti-gay discrimination.
The second formulation, however, makes the point that
immutability is one reason why it is irrational to discriminate
against lesbians and gay men, while leaving room for the addi-
tional showing, necessary when it comes to private discrimina-
tion, that it is not just irrational, but also wrong, to discriminate
against people based upon a characteristic they did not choose
and cannot change.
Halley does much more than dispute the force of the immu-
tability argument in equal protection doctrine. She also chal-
lenges the premise that sexual orientation is immutable. She
opens this challenge by observing that people sometimes
"become" gay or recognize their homosexuality relatively late in
life.1 16 Professor Halley's point, true though it may be, does not
defeat the immutability argument. Note the phrasing of the
immutability point: it is wrong to discriminate against people
immutable for some people and chosen by others). Nevertheless, it would still
be wrong to do so.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
116. See Halley, The Politics of the Close4 supra note 111, at 945.
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based upon a characteristic they did not choose and cannot
change. Something "they cannot change" is quite different from
something that "never changes." Specifically, the difference is
whether mutability is within the individual's control. If change is
not voluntary, then the characteristic is, for moral purposes,
immutable. 17 Thus, the fact that in some cases sexual orienta-
tion either changes, or is discovered, later in life is not an ade-
quate answer to the moral force of immutability.
Admittedly, sexual orientation may not be immutable for all
gay men and lesbians.' 18 The point is that the testimony of
countless people regarding their perceptions of their sexual ori-
entations,1 9 together with emerging evidence of a link between
biology and sexual orientation, 2 ° makes it clear that at least for
many gays, sexual orientation is immutable, and an essential
aspect of self.121 While Professor Halley recognizes the autobio-
117. It also does not matter if a characteristic is biologically determined, a
matter to which Professor Halley devotes considerable attention. See Halley, The
Politics of Biology, supra note 111, at 529-46. While I agree with her that the
scientific evidence of a biological basis for sexual orientation is thus far
tentative (although I disagree with some of her criticisms of the studies, see infra
text accompanying notes 134-37), it would not matter even if it were proven
that there is no biological cause if sexual orientation were shown to be
immutable regardless of its cause. In other words, a characteristic need not be
biologically-based to be immutable. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982)
(finding that status as the child of an illegal alien is, for the child, "a legal
characteristic over which children can have little control"). For other reasons,
Halley suggests that supporters of the immutability argument are compelled
also to claim that homosexuality is "biologically determined," but her reasoning
on this point is unconvincing. See infra text accompanying note 128.
118. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism
and the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REv. 1833, 1836 (1993) (arguing that the
conflict between essentialism and constructivism as explanations of gay identity
is largely false because "gay identity, like most forms of human identity, is too
variegated, contested, and complex for any single term to capture").
119. See, e.g., NAVA & DAWIDOFF, supra note 2, at 73 (expressing the belief
that "homosexuality is not a choice but innate" and resting that claim on
"thousands of books by gays and lesbians about their lives and the lives of others
.... [a] body of work [that] represents the testimony of those who have the most
knowledge of homosexuality, and lesbians and gay men consistently speak of
their homosexuality as something in their natures over which they exercise no
control"); MOHR, supra note 44, at 39-40 (explaining that the "experience of
coming out to oneself [i.e., the realization and acceptance of one's sexual
orientation] has for gays the basic structure of discovery, not the structure of a
choice") (emphasis in original).
120. See infra notes 135-36.
121. I recognize and agree with Daniel Ortiz's point that whether sexual
orientation is "essential" is different from whether it is immutable. See Ortiz,
supra note 118, at 1837 (distinguishing debate between "essentialists" and
"constructivists" from the "determinism/voluntarism debate"); cf supra note
117 (distinguishing questions of biological basis for homosexuality and of
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graphical evidence of many gay men and lesbians' life experi-
ence,1.22 she minimizes it because "other people who experience
anti-gay discrimination tell quite different stories," and "under-
stand themselves to have chosen the form of their desire or the
ways in which they structure their lives."12 . In other words, Hal-
ley implies, little weight should be given to the stories of those
who experience their sexual orientation as essential and immuta-
ble because others do not experience their sexuality in the same
way.1
2 4
immutability). I also agree with Ortiz that whether being gay is "essential"
depends on what one means by "gay." See Ortiz, supra note 118, at 1845-46
(arguing that an essentialist believes that "[g]ay people ... are simply those who
experience same-sex desire" while a constructivist "describes gay people
primarily in terms of their social roles and their relationship to other features of
social life"). I mean "gay" in the first sense used by Ortiz - persons whose
sexual desires are primarily directed at members of the same sex. I am, in other
words, discussing the basic orientation and not the social trappings associated
with gay men and lesbians in our culture. Given this understanding of the
terms, it is my view that much homosexuality is both essential, in the sense that
"gayness is an intrinsic property, one that does not vary across history and
culture," id. at 1836, and immutable.
122. Halley, The Politics of Biology, supra note I11, at 526 (quoting Tom
McNaught's understanding of his sexuality: "It's not a matter of choice. It's
whom I am.... It's genetic." Cited in Tony Rogers, 'Why' of Homosexuality, CHI.
TiuB., June 2, 1993, at C2.).
123. Id. (citation omitted). Although I believe that sexual orientation
(gay, straight, or bisexual) is most often not chosen, I reject Richard Mohr's
dismissive view of those who say they chose their sexual orientations. See Mox-,
supra note 44, at 41-42 (rejecting stories of lesbians who claim to have made a
"politically motivated" choice of their sexual orientation because "this claim
simply overlooks the psychobiological truth ... that one's sexual arousals are
not subject to the blandishments of one's will") (citation omitted). I am
skeptical of any one narrow "psychobiological truth" that seeks to explain all
human sexual experience (even if it happens to fit my own), especially one that
is contrary. to the stories of many people who have experienced their sexuality
as a matter of choice. I see no reason why some people might have an
immutable sexual orientation while others could have chosen theirs. Indeed,
given the variety of tastes, desires, and experiences in all other sexual matters, it
seems inherently more plausible that human beings would vary in this respect
than that we would all fit one model.
124. Professor Halley also rejects the testimony of gays and lesbians whose
experience does not fit her model "because it obscures the historical,
institutional, and political processes that produce identity." Halley, The Politics
of Biology, supra note 111, at 527. In other words, Halley rejects the stories of
those who experience their sexual orientation as a natural (and, yes, essential)
aspect of their self as false consciousness resulting from a socially constructed
identity. It is arrogant for Halley - or others who form the "strong currents in
the pro-gay movements (who] critique the very impulse to organize around gay
and lesbian identity" - either to suppose they know best the nature of other
peoples' sexual identities, or (worse yet) to argue that the identities they claim
are false. Id. The same is true of "pure" essentialists like Mohr, who reject even
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The answer to this is simple: the force of the immutability
argument does not depend on all gays being immutably homo-
sexual. Even assuming that sexual orientation is not always immu-
table, the right of "immutable" lesbians and gay men to be
treated fairly is enough to justify making the argument, both in
the moral debate and in constitutional litigation. At worst, this
would mean that "mutable" lesbians and gay men may benefit
from establishing legal rules that treat "immutable homosexual-
ity" in a manner consistent with the treatment of other immuta-
ble characteristics - a side-effect not directly supported by the
immutability argument, but which is justified by the many other
ways in which it is wrong to discriminate even against "mutable"
gays and lesbians. 2It is true that anti-ga y forces have attempted to cite the pres-
ence of some "mutable" gays to justify an anti-gay program. 26 It
is chilling that anti-gay polemicists are willing to "'condemn
youngsters, who from earliest memories know themselves to be
gay,' "127 in order to affect others whose sexuality is less certain.
the possibility that some people could have chosen their sexual identities. See
supra note 123.
125. See supra note 109 (describing moral arguments advanced against
anti-gay discrimination).
126. See Halley, The Politics of Biology, supra note 111, at 520-21 (noting the
argument justifying anti-gay policies because "even if only some .children are
sexual orientation 'waverers,' social policy must 'give [them] clear, repeated
signals as to society's preference' that they elect heterosexuality") (quoting E.L.
Pattullo, Straight Talk About Gays, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1992, at 24.).
127. Id. (quoting E. L. Pattullo, Straight Talk About Gays, COMMENTARY,
Dec. 1992, at 24.). An alternative response to the immutability point is to argue
that, even if orientation is immutable, the choice still exists to engage in the
behavior, and it is homosexual conduct which (a) distinguishes sexual
orientation from other characteristics that are the basis for antidiscrimination
protections, see, e.g., Duncan, supra note 16, at 401-05 & nn. 34-35, and (b) is
immoral and can be the subject of policies aimed at deterring it. See supra note
104 (describing Finnis' argument that homosexual conduct, rather than the
orientation, is immoral). These claims, captured in Professor Duncan's
argument that "even if biology determines the inclination, as human beings
capable of moral reasoning homosexuals remain free to choose whether to act
on the inclinations," Duncan, supra note 16, at 402 n.35, miss the point of the
immutability argument. Immutability makes "moral reasoning" irrelevant to
behaviors that naturally flow from a particular orientation. Human beings are,
in significant part, sexual creatures, for whom sexual conduct is a fundamental
part of a complete life. I cannot fathom the "moral reasoning" that.holds, for
those for, whom same-sex sexual desires are an essential and immutable fact of
their sexual nature, that the price of equal treatment is involuntary life-long
abstinence from sex. Or, if I can fathom the reasoning, I find it indescribably
cruel and alien to American values of privacy, individual autonomy, limited
government, and fairness. Consider, for example, the reaction that would
follow if, in response to widespread discrimination against heterosexuals, a
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However, most Americans would agree that it is immoral to pun-
ish one group of people for something they did not choose in
the hope of influencing another group's choices; hence the
importance of advancing the immutability argument. Professor
Halley is wrong that essentialists are forced to "claim that homo-
sexuality is . .. biologically determined" to respond to anti-gay
forces who favor "a program of discrimination actually tailored to
prevent people who can choose to become homosexual from
doing so in the first place."128 Claiming that such a program can-
not work because homosexuality is biologically determined is not
the best answer. Rather, the best answer is to argue that a pro-
gram of discrimination such as Pattullo recommends is corrupt
even if it would influence some people, because of the immoral
manner in which it treats those who could not have been influ-
enced. It would be little different from punishing the children of
interracial couples (who cannot change their status in this
regard) in order to discourage others from entering into interra-
cial relationships. Even if this were not impermissible race dis-
crimination, it would be wrong to punish the children who made
no choice in order to influence the future choices of others.
Perhaps Halley's most disturbing claim is that the repression
of lesbians and gay men that keeps so many in the closet helps to
prove that homosexuality is not immutable - because the differ-
ent behavior in which closeted gays and lesbians engage (differ-
ent, that is, from how they would have behaved if they were
openly gay) "is a change... [in the] representation of sexual orien-
legislator said that she would vote against any law banning "anti-straight"
discrimination because, after all, those heterosexuals, natural and immutable as
their orientation might be to them, and strong as their sexual drives might be,
need only refrain from heterosexual behavior to avoid the discrimination.
Certainly, one response to this position would be the practical one, which is
that humanity has a basic need for heterosexual conduct for reproduction. But
an even more powerful answer would be to challenge the inherent cruelty of
condemning a whole class of people to lives that are, in a central way, empty of
fulfillment, joy, and happiness. The cruelty is no less profound when directed
at gay men and lesbians.
A different, but in my view equally powerful, critique of the argument that
sexual orientation has a behavioral component that makes it different from
race and other protected characteristics, is offered by Professor Schacter, who
argues that "[pJroviding legal protection only to attributes perceived as
involuntary reduces civil rights laws to codes of conformity and implicitly
stigmatizes difference." Schacter, supra note 35, at 307 (footnote omitted). She
also points out that many different "behaviors" associated with a protected
characteristic are, in fact, protected by civil rights laws, and thus that
homosexual orientation and corresponding homosexual conduct do not differ
in this regard. Id. at 308.
128. Halley, The Politics of Biology, supra note 111, at 521.
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tation available for social interpretation." 1' Although she con-
cedes that "what has changed is not the supposed essence of sexual
orientation,"" ° this is not a significant concession in light of Pro-
fessor Halley's skepticism of essentialism.' She concludes that
because repression alters behavior (and for other reasons), the
orientation is not essential, and not immutable."'2 Tomy mind,
whether people hide being gay to avoid discrimination has noth-
ing to do with whether they are gay or even with what it means to
be gay.133
In addition, Professor Halley makes the tendentious argu-
ment that some studies showing a genetic link to homosexuality
are flawed because the researchers asked subjects to identify a
sexual orientation, and thus "they have simply assumed [the]
bipolar model of sexual orientation."3 4 Any study of the issue
may be rejected as invalid if one assumes that there are no genu-
ine categories of sexual orientation to examine. But studies
showing a correlation between a physical reality like genes 3 1 or
brain structure 3 6 and sexual self-identification are powerful evi-
dence that the category itself, in John Boswell's words, "exists
129. Halley, The Politics of the Closet, supra note 111, at 934 (emphasis in
original).
130. Id. (emphasis in original).
131. See id. at 934-37 (discussing recency of the "idea that homosexuality
is a fixed propensity that fundamentally characterizes individuals," and
favorably noting the view that there is no "pure and natural 'essential
homosexuality' [that] can be posited for study"). See also Janet E. Halley,
Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA.
L. Rzv. 1721, 1723 & n.3 (1993) (explicitly adopting a constructivist view of
sexual identity).
132. The most troubling aspect of Halley's argument is the power it
hands to anti-gay forces to define gay men and lesbians by the force of their
oppression. This is, in fact, a recurring problem in Professor Halley's work, as
she acknowledges. See Halley, The Politics of Biology, supra note 11, at 525 n.84
(conceding that "this article . . . is ripe for misappropriation by anti-gay
constructivists willing to distort its central points").
133. Cf. Ortiz, supra note 118, at 1835 ("The questions of how a person
comes to have same-sex desire and of how that person is viewed are completely
independent.").
134. Halley, The Politics of Biology, supra note 11, at 539.
135. See Halley, The Politics of Biology, supra note 1I1, at 532-34 (describing
study by Dean Hamer "suggesting that male homosexuality might be genetically
transmitted through the mother").
136. See id. at 534 (describing study by Simon LeVay which "found that a
group of cells in a certain portion of the brain . . . was larger in men he
classified as heterosexual than in men he classified as homosexual"). I agree
with Halley that there were significant flaws in the method by which LeVay
classified his subjects. See id. at 535-37.
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because humans perceive a real order in the world and name
i."137it.lS
Finally, Professor Halley attributes great significance to the
fact that the modern Western understanding of homosexuality is
a relatively recent phenomenon, which for her is evidence that
the category itself is a social construct, not an essential part of
some peoples' identities."' 8 To the contrary, the emergence of
this conception tells us much more about the ebbing authority of
cultural and religious forces which in the past repressed the
expression of same-sex desire, and hence the concept of homo-
sexual identity, while at the same time keeping much evidence of
gay men and lesbians' lives out of the historical record.139Thus, the immutability argument, tied to the idea that
homosexuality is an essential aspect of many lesbians and gay
men's personalities, has great moral weight. Persuasively articu-
lated by gays and lesbians, it provides the rest of the answer necL
essary to the "special rights" rhetoric. Once it is understood that
the antidiscrimination rights are crucial aspects of full citizen-
ship, the battle is half won. Gay rights advocates can add to that
case the compelling moral arguments that (a) homosexual con-
duct is not per se immoral, and (b) in fact, it is immoral to deny
civil rights to lesbians and gay men because (among other rea-
sons) sexual orientation is, at least in many cases, immutable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Anti-gay forces have, to this point, had great success using
the "special rights" claim to convince voters to repeal laws pro-
tecting gay men and lesbians from discrimination. This success
need not, and should not, continue. Use of the answers that car-
137. John Boswell, Revolutions, Universals, and Sexual Categories, in HIDDEN
FROM HISTORY. RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAsr 17 (Martin Duberman et
al. eds., 1989). It seems clear that Professor Halley would accept (and tout) the
result of a study that showed no correlation between any discernible physical
reality and sexual orientation as proof that the categories themselves are mere
social constructs. But if a study does show a correlation, Halley wants to reject it
anyway because she claims the categories are invalid, despite the correlation. In
effect, if the game comes out the wrong way, Halley simply takes the ball and
goes home.
138. Halley, The Politics of the Closet, supra note 111, at 934-37.
139. Einstein's theory of relativity was also not articulated until this
century. The fact that we only lately gained this appreciation of the nature of
the physical universe does not make it any less accurate. The same is true of
Darwinism; the recency of the theory of evolution does not show that it is
invalid. It merely shows that cultural and religious conditions had previously
prevented us from even considering the theory and perhaps that scientific
conditions prevented us from discovering and testing it.
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ried the day in 1964, combined with those new ones necessary for
our own latter-day fight, can produce the same outcome as 30
years ago.

